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NOTES
BUFFALO FORGE CO. v. UNITED STEELWORKERS:
THE SUPREME COURT SANCTIONS SYMPATHY STRIKES
N Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,' the Supreme Court held
by a 5-4 majority that a sympathy strike, in alleged violation of a no-
strike clause, could not be enjoined pending an arbitrator's determination
of the strike's legality. Prior to this decision the circuits had been in con-
flict: some held that the strike could be enjoined 2 pursuant to section
301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA) which provides
federal jurisdiction for violations of collective bargaining agreements, 3
while others refused to enjoin the strike4 because of the anti-injunction
policy stated in section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLA). 5 In
'428 U.S. 397 (1976).
2 See notes 95-112 infra and accompanying text.
3 Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) pro-
vides:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
4 See notes 113-32 infra and accompanying text.
5 Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970) provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining or-
der or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested
in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly
or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment; . . .
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other meth-
od not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assemblying peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute; .
(Emphasis added.)
The injunction ban is not absolute. Section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia, 29 U.S.C. § 107
(1970), provides that an injunction may issue only after a hearing upon notice to the
charged parties is held and certain findings of facts are made. The findings must gen-
erally state: that unlawful acts have or will be committed; that irreparable injury will
result if the injunction is not issued; and, that there is no adequate remedy at law. A
temporary restraining order, however, may be issued without notice or hearing if the
court finds irreparable injury will be unavoidable if the strike is not immediately en-
joined. The procedural requirements are strict. For example, since section 4 prohibits
the issuance of an injunction, mere compliance with the procedures of section 7, 29 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1970), will not allow the injunction to issue. Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama
S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960). The mere compliance with some but not all of the criteria
in section 8, 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1970), would be insufficient to have an injunction issued.
The party must have pursued each channel of peaceful settlement (i.e., negotiation,
mediation, and arbitration) before the injunction might issue, even though the section is
phrased in the disjunctive. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Lodge 27 v. Toledo, P. & W.
R.R., 321 U.S. 50, 60 (1944).
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Buffalo Forge the Court followed the second line of cases and resolved
the controversy in favor of the continued vitality of section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act 6 was enacted in 1932 to curb the un-
bridled use of the federal injunction as a remedy in labor-management
disputes. Federal courts had in many instances, wantonly and unjusti-
fiably enjoined even peaceful strike activity, and as a consequence had
stifled the growth of labor organizations.7 Because of the history of ju-
dicial abuse of the injunction, Congress sought to make this remedy a last
resort8 by encouraging the use of the nonjudicial processes of negotia-
tion, mediation, and arbitration to settle labor disputes. The result was
the enactment of section 4 of the NLA which prohibits federal injunctive
relief "in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute."9
The purpose underlying Norris-LaGuardia was to facilitate a produc-
tive climate for the organization of labor untions. After enactment of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, labor unions grew and gained substantial
collective bargaining power. Congressional policy then shifted from
promoting the organization of labor unions to encouraging the effective
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements between employers
and unions.10
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
7 Congress intended to take the federal courts out of the "labor-injunction business."
Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369 (1960) (peaceful pick-
eting not enjoinable); S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1932); H.R. REP. No. 669,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1932); 75 CONG. REC. 5464, 5467, 5478 (1932). See F. FRANK-
FURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR-INJUNCTION 24-46, 131-33, 200-02 (1930). See also
A. Cox & D. BOK, CASES ON LABOR LAW 60 (8th ed. 1977); 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 580-612
(1970); STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 161-247 (R.
Korentz ed. 1970).
Congress promulgated the Norris-LaGuardia Act to restore the vitality of section 20 of
the Clayton Act, which had been frustrated by unduly restrictive judicial interpretation.
See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 234, 235-36 (1941). Section 20 of the
Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), tempered the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by exempting
peaceful labor activities from the interdict against unlawful trusts or conspiracies in re-
straint of trade. Courts, had however, read into the Clayton Act that which the Act had
intended to remove: the restriction of the scope of section 20 to trade union activities di-
rected against an employer by his employees. The Norris-LaGuardia Act removed the
employer-employee restriction and broadened the allowable scope of non-enjoinable union
activity. See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 165-66 (1930).
1 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Lodge 27 v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50, 58-59
(1944). The Act did not completely abolish the federal injunction, but provided that be-
fore a federal court could enter an injunction to restrain illegal acts, certain preliminary
findings, based on evidence, had to be made. See note 5 supra.
9 For relevant portions of the text of section 4, see note 5 supra. Section 13 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1970), defines a labor dispute as: "any controversy
concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or repre-
sentation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
10 Section 203(d) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970),
illustrates this purpose: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising
over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
. .See A.H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers, Int'l, 155 F. Supp. 739, 742 (E.D.N.Y. 1957)
(specific performance of collective bargaining contract decreed). The Act not only im-
posed a responsibility on the labor organizations to bargain in good faith and to be ac-
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Congress' primary motive for enacting the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act i' in 1947 was to promote collective bargaining between labor
and management, a congressional purpose that had not been contem-
plated when the Norris-LaGuardia Act was written in 1932. The LMRA,
for example, made it clear, to the extent that it was not already estab-
lished, that labor unions were to be capable of suing and being sued in
the name of the union.'2 This concept was important because unions are
unincorporated associations and unincorporated associations are usually
considered subject to suit only in the name of their individual members. 13
The original House and Senate versions of the LMRA would have
made collective bargaining agreements enforceable by the National
Labor Relations Board in unfair labor practice proceedings. 4 This ap-
proach was abandoned in Conference, where it was decided to leave the
enforcement of labor contracts "to the usual processes of law."' 5 Thus,
section 301(a) provided federal courts with jurisdiction over "[s]uits
for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion." 16
Subsequent to enactment of the LMRA management and labor be-
gan to bargain for specific contract provisions to safeguard their rights
and expectations. The employer often bargained for the inclusion of a
no-strike clause to guarantee unimpeded production for the duration of
the labor contract and as consideration for his concomitant agreement to
peacefully arbitrate grievances with the union. The no-strike obligation
and the arbitration procedures became standard bargained-for provi-
countable for violations of the agreement, but also balanced labor's generous freedom from
judicial restraint that had flowed from the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This Act, in effect, gave
management a mandate to be free from coercive union conduct. It promoted the en-
forceability of collective bargaining agreements in much the same way that Norris-
LaGuardia fostered the growth of labor unions by prohibiting sweeping, unjustified and
many times ex parte injunctions. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656
(7th Cir. 1966) (union violated National Labor Relations Act by imposing fine on union
members who refused to honor picket lines); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15,
17-18 (1947); 93 CONG. REc. 3656-57 (1947).
11 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
12 "The common law concept of an unincorporated labor organization as a
group of individuals having no separate entity apart from its members has been
discarded - to the extent that it was not already outmoded in modem jurispru-
dence - by the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947. It is clear that the Act
treats labor organizations, for all practical purposes, as juridical entities .. "
In re International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 79 N.L.R.B. 1487, 1508
n.40 (1948).
13 See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCrION 82-83 (1930).
14 The National Labor Relations Board, under section 10(b) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970), is empowered to issue an unfair labor practice
complaint whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an un-
fair labor practice. Unfair labor practice charges against employers are generally listed
in section 8(a)(1)-(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)-(4)
(1970); unfair labor practice charges against employees are generally listed in section
8(b)(1)-(7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)-(7) (1970).
Section 10(b) provides that whenever an unfair labor practice charge is made, the
National Labor Relations Board "shall have power to issue" a complaint to the charged
party, containing a notice of hearing. The hearing is then conducted before the Board.
15 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947).
18 The text of section 301(a) is set out in full at note 3 supra.
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sions17 with the no-strike commitment by the union generally regarded
as the quid pro quo for the employer's obligation to submit to final and
binding arbitration of labor disputes.18
Judicial deference to section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, how-
ever, soon qualified the no-strike guarantee. Judges refused to enjoin
strikes in alleged violation of no-strike clauses, basing their decisions
on the force of section 4.19 Employers, who would not have acceded
to mandatory arbitration but for the no-strike clause, contended that the
more recent section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act quali-
fied section 4's prohibition against injunctions. More specifically, they
argued that the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining sup-
ported the issuance of an injunction when necessary to enforce the no-
strike clause as well as other provisions of the labor contract. Hence,
a conflict arose when a party sought an injunction in a situation that
not only grew out of a labor dispute, rendering Norris-LaGuardia ap-
plicable, but also violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement,
calling into play section 301 remedies.
Congress did not reconcile the disparate jurisdictional provisions of
the NLA and the LMRA. The courts concluded they were duty-bound
to follow both legislative acts and not to engage in "judicial legislation. '" 20
But, as the Supreme Court has noted, the congressional will is not always
expressly stated and courts must occasionally "judicially invent" a treat-
ment Congress would have followed had it realized the existence of a
particular problem. 2' The courts, therefore, were left with the task of
deciding the controlling statute when both section 4 of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act and section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act
provided contrary, but applicable solutions for a single factual situation.
The sympathy strike in alleged violation of a no-strike clause pro-
vided an arena for the Court's accommodation between the broad and
competing provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act. A sympathy strike originates after the establish-
ment of a picket line when workers refuse to cross the picket lines out
of "sympathy" with the picketers. The sympathy strike, therefore, de-
velops out of a labor dispute between the picketers and the employer
17 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 565 (1960). The Court
noted that the grievance procedure culminating in arbitration became regarded as the
"standard form."
18 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). Congress has noted
that arbitration is a more salutary method for the settlement of labor disputes than is
economic warfare through strikes or lock-outs. This policy is stated in section 201 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1970).
19 See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 200, 203, 209 (1962) (section 4
precluded injunctive relief even if alleged strikes constituted breach of collective bar-
gaining agreement containing no-strike and grievance-arbitration clauses).
20 Courts are obligated to follow the acts of Congress and neither be concerned with
the wisdom nor the contemporary applicability of those acts. United States v. Hutche-
son, 312 U.S. 219, 235 (1941) (in determining whether trade union conduct violated the
Sherman Act, the Court held the Sherman Act had to be read in conjunction with sec-
tion 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act) (quoting Johnson v. United
States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908)).
21 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1967).
[Vol. 25:435
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and not from any underlying grievance between the employer and the
sympathy strikers. The right to engage in a sympathy strike is statu-
torily protected, but such a right may be bargained away.2 2 Because
the strike "[grows] out of a labor dispute," section 4 of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act operates to prohibit issuance of an injunction against the
peaceful strike activity. On the other hand, the sympathy strike is
arguably a violation of the no-strike clause contained in the parties'
collective bargaining agreement, and therefore constitutes an arbitrable
grievance permitting the issuance of a temporary injunction until the is-
sue has been resolved. Section 301 of the LMRA affords federal courts
jurisdiction over violations of labor contracts2 3 and, more importantly,
the section neither expressly nor impliedly restricts the federal court's
equitable remedies to those other than the enjoining of strike activity
determined to be in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
2 4
In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,25 locals 1974 and 3732
of the United Steelworkers, representing the company's production and
maintenance employees, refused to cross the picket lines of sister
unions 26 at the company's three facilities in the Buffalo, New York area.
The locals' refusal to cross the picket lines resulted in a series of work
stoppages at the company's plants. 27  The collective bargaining agree-
22 NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80 (1953). A person who re-
fuses to cross a picket line becomes a striker. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland
Typographical Union 53, 520 F.2d 1220, 1228 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909
(1976) (injunction denied). He is only entitled to the same statutory protection as the
economic strikers he supports. NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 426 F.2d 1299,
1301 (5th Cir. 1970) (employee who honored picket lines retained employee status and
was entitled to reinstatement at end of strike); NLRB v. Louisville Chair Co., 385 F.2d
922, 928 n.3 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968) (employers refusal to
bargain in good faith gave rise to an unfair labor practice strike).
23 Norris-LaGuardia's ban on injunctions only exists at the federal level. Congress
did not intend to interfere with state court equity jurisdiction. Charles Dowd Box Co.
v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509, 511 (1962). Moreover, the language of section 301 pro-
vides that suits for violation of contracts may be brought in federal district courts, but it
does not require it. Removal jurisdiction, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970),
could be obtained whereby the state court's injunction would be dissolved. The Court, in
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), held that unions could remove state
court suits brought under section 301 to federal court. This effectively destroyed state
court equity jurisdiction to issue injunctions, since the state court injunction upon removal
to federal court, could be dissolved in accordance with section 4.
24 See note 3 supra. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957), the
Supreme Court noted that section 301 is not merely a jurisdictional statute, but that it
provides a grant of authority to apply substantive law which will be fashioned from the
policy of existing national labor laws. For a discussion of Lincoln Mills, see notes 40-43
infra and accompanying text.
25 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
28 The picket lines were bona fide, primary, and legal. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari
at 3-4. Primary strike activity is legal since it is only directed against the employer and
his allies with whom the striking union has a dispute. Secondary strike activity, which
is illegal, indirectly places pressure on the primary employer by acting against secondary or
neutral employers that deal with the primary employer. See section 8(b)(4)(B) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970).
27 The sister unions, representing the company's office and technical workers, went on
strike and established picket lines on November 16, 1974, during negotiations for a col-
lective bargaining contract. The Locals' first refusal to cross their lines occurred on No-
vember 18, 1974. This work stoppage lasted only for one day. Another work stoppage 5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
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ment between the company and the locals contained a no-strike clause
and a six-step grievance procedure which culminated in final and binding
arbitration. 28  The terms of the agreement provided that either party
could summon arbitration, and this right extended to any dispute as to
the "meaning and application of the provisions" of the agreement.29
The company filed suit under section 301 in district court, contending
that the locals were obligated to cross the picket lines by virtue of their
contractual no-strike obligation. The company further submitted that
the dispute that arose over the legality of the sympathy strike was arbi-
trable under the agreement's grievance and arbitration provisions and
that the strike should be enjoined pending the arbitrator's decision as
to whether the no-strike clause had been violated. 30  The district court
denied the prayer for injunctive relief and held that the strike did not
constitute an arbitrable grievance. 31  The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the decision to deny the injunction. 32
commenced on November 21, 1974, at the defendant-International Union's direction. It
ended on December 14, 1974, one day after a decision was rendered against the com-
pany's application for a preliminary injunction. The issue, however, did not become moot.
The picket lines remained during the appeal, and a resumption of the strike was possible.
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207, 1209-10 (2d Cir. 1975).
2' The no-strike obligation, Section 14b, provided: "There shall be no strikes, work
stoppages or interruption or impeding of work. No officers or representatives of the
Union shall authorize, instigate, aid or condone any such activities. No employee shall
participate in any such activity."
The adjustment of grievances provision, Section 26, provided: "'Should differences
arise between the Company and any employee covered by this Agreement as to the mean-
ing and application of the provisions of this Agreement, or should any trouble of any kind
arise in the plant, there shall be no suspension of work on account of such differences.
. . . quoted in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 386 F. Supp. 405, 407
(W.D.N.Y. 1974).
2 Section 32 provided that "a question as to the meaning and application of the pro-
vision of th[e] Agreement .. ." could be submitted to arbitration by any party. Re-
spondent's Brief for Certiorari at 2-3.
30 386 F. Supp. 405, 407, 408-09 (W.D.N.Y. 1974). The employer claimed, in the
alternative, that the work stoppage did not occur merely from a refusal to cross the picket
lines. The company claimed it occurred when one of the defendant union-members, a
plant truck driver, was ordered to drive a non-company tractor trailer through the picket
lines, but refused to do so. Both parties agreed that if the truck driver's refusal to
drive the non-company truck had caused the sympathy strike, then the matter would be
subject to grievance provisions. The unions, however, refuted this allegation and the
court similarly found that the plaintiff had not sustained its burden of proof on this issue.
The evidence supported the fact that the unions walked out in support of the sister union's
picket lines. The issue therefore centered around whether the work stoppage was a viola-
tion of the no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement and whether the
unions who refused to cross the picket lines were subject to the mandatory adjustment
and grievance procedures of the agreement. 386 F. Supp. at 407, 408-09.
3' 386 F. Supp. at 410. The court intimated that its holding might have been dif-
ferent had the grievance procedure contained "additional provisions," more broadly per-
taining to "matters not specifically mentioned in the Agreement." The court noted that
Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973) and Bar-
nard College v. Transport Workers, 372 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (wherein sympathy
strikes were enjoined) appeared to support the company's position. The court, however,
failed to explain the fact that the contracts in these cases did not contain "additional
language."
Even though the agreement provided for arbitration to determine the meaning and
application of the agreement, and specifically prohibited work stoppages, the court sub-
mitted that it could not be assumed that a sympathy strike would be covered by these
provisions and refused to reach this result by implication.
[Vol. 25:435
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Because of a conflict in the circuits, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held by a 5-4 majority that a sympathy strike in alleged
violation of a no-strike clause could not be enjoined pending an arbi-
trator's decision on the legality of the strike.3 3  Furthermore, the Court
held that the sympathy strike situation did not compel an accommoda-
tion between the NLA and the LMRA which would result in issuance of
an injunction pending the arbitrator's determinations.34  The purpose of
this Note is to examine this Supreme Court decision in light of the con-
current federal policies that not only encourage the enforcement of col-
lective bargaining agreements through the grievance-arbitration proce-
dures, but also seek to protect a worker's statutory right to engage in
sympathy strikes unless that right has been bargained away by the con-
tractual no-strike clause.
I. THE SUPP.EME COURT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ACCOMMODATION POLICY
The Supreme Court has been inconsistent both in formulating its ac-
commodation policy between the NLA and LMRA and in developing an
approach to federal labor contract law.
The Supreme Court made one of its first ventures into the area of
accommodation in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &
Ind. R.R. Co., 35 in which it reconciled competing provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia and Railway Labor Acts. The Court noted that the
accommodation, if possible, must be made in such a way "that the ob-
The appellate court in Island Creek Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 507 F.2d 650,
653 (3d Cir. 1975), recognized that the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of
1971, to which the parties were bound, did not contain an express no-strike clause. The
agreement did, however, extend arbitration to "matters not specifically mentioned" in the
contract. The court interpreted this to allow it to submit a dispute over the legality of a
sympathy strike to arbitration. It enjoined the strike pending the arbitrator's determina-
tion on the legality of the strike. The court, however, noted the "unusually broad" scope
of the arbitration clause. Therefore, it expressly cautioned against treating its decision as
authority that employees could be automatically enjoined from sympathy striking when they
were bound by more narrow grievance-arbitration clauses. Id. at 653-54.
The sympathy strike was also enjoined when the no-strike obligation was contained
within the grievance-arbitration provisions. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 195 v. Cross
Bros. Meat Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1975) (suit to enforce arbitrator's award;
not to compel arbitration). The no-strike obligation provided that "[t]he Union further
agrees not to call a sympathy strike for any reason whatsoever during the term of this
agreement." Id. at 1116 n. 2 . The union had requested that its members respect the
picket line of another union and this request was heeded. The appellate court granted
the injunction since the grievance machinery was to become operative "[s]hould any
difference arise between the parties ... as to the interpretation or application of this
agreement, [whereby] an earnest effort [would] be made to settle such difference ....
Id. The court stated that "[w]hile these clauses did not specifically refer to the disputes
over the right of the employees to honor lawful picket lines, they were contained in the
same articles that contained sweeping no-strike clauses." Hence, the court reasoned it
was natural to infer that the scope of the no-strike clause was a proper subject for arbitra-
tion. Id. at 1117.
32 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975). The issue presented was one of first impression in
the Second Circuit.
33 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
31 Id. at 412.
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vious purpose in the enactment of each is preserved."3 6 The Court
found that because the Norris-LaGuardia Act was the predecessor of the
Railway Labor Act and more general in its import, the broader termi-
nology of Norris-LaGuardia had to be tempered by the more specific
language of the Railway Labor Act.3 7  Therefore, it was held that pur-
suant to the terms of section 3 of the Railway Labor Act a labor union
could be enjoined from striking the railroad. That statute authorized
either party to submit a minor dispute a to the National Railroad Ad-
justment Board;3 9 the decision would be final and binding on both
parties.
The Court decided Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills40 in the same term
as Chicago River. In Lincoln Mills the Court found in section 301(a) of
the LMRA a mandate for the federal courts to develop a federal common
law consistent with the national labor policy.41 The Court further held
that section 301 have federal courts jurisdiction to compel arbitration of
a labor dispute since the Court noted that compulsory arbitration had
not been an abuse which prompted the enactment of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act.42 Because federal jurisdiction to compel arbitration was not con-
trary to the legislative purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as the Act
only prohibited injunctions against legitimate strike activity, and be-
cause that Act failed to provide effective remedies for violations of arbi-
tration agreements, the Court concluded that agreements to arbitrate
should not be subject to the inappropriate provisions of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act. 43
36 Id. at 40.
3' The Court remarked that: "The Norris-LaGuardia Act [could] affect the present
decree only so far as its provisions [were] found not to conflict with those of [section 3,
first], of the Railway Labor Act, authorizing the [injunctive] relief which [had] been
granted. Such provisions cannot be rendered nugatory by the earlier and more general
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Id. at 41 (footnotes omitted).
31 Section 2, Sixth, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Sixth (1970), defines minor disputes as "disputes
growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions."
3' Section 3, First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1970), pro-
vides that minor disputes shall be submitted to the Adjustment Board if not resolved in
conference by the railroad and its employees. The Adjustment Board has exclusive origi-
nal jurisdiction to hear and resolve disputes arising out of labor agreements, thereby
precluding a court's adjudication of the construction and application of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. Walker v. Southern Ry. Co., 385 U.S. 196, 198 (1966); Transporta-
tion-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, 162-66
(1966); Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry. Co., 382 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1965); Order of
Ry. Conductors v. Southern Ry. Co., 339 U.S. 255, 256-57 (1950).
40 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Several grievances arose between the employer and union
and were processed through the grievance procedures outlined in the parties' collective
bargaining agreement. The union requested arbitration, the last step in the grievance
procedure, but the employer declined to submit. The union brought an action in district
court to compel arbitration, which was granted pursuant to section 301.
41 Id. at 456.
4 Id. at 458. The Court stated that "the failure to arbitrate was not part and parcel of
the abuses against which the [Norris-LaGuardia] Act was aimed." Justice Brennan used
this argument to bolster his dissent in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 219-
20 (1962). In Sinclair he advocated accommodation of the NLA and the LMRA to
enjoin a strike over an arbitrable grievance.
41 353 U.S. at 458.
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The Court bolstered the policy favoring the arbitration process in
the Steelworkers Trilogy.44 In this series of cases the Court noted that
arbitration was such a critical element of national labor policy that a dis-
pute should be "presumed 45 to be arbitrable unless the contract ex-
pressly excluded the dispute from coverage. 46 All doubtful cases were
to be resolved in favor of arbitration.47 Moreover, under section 301(a),
federal courts were constrained to look only to the face of the contract
to determine whether the parties had provided for arbitration of the
particular dispute.48 Judges were warned against applying ordinary
contract law principles to labor contracts because the collective bar-
gaining agreement is not only a contract between labor and manage-
ment but also a political system of governance of labor disputes. The
arbitrator, a specialist in labor relations, was considered more compe-
tent in the interpretation of labor contracts than the courts. 49 The courts
were instructed to determine only the arbitrability of the dispute and
to respect the unique role of the arbitrator in the actual interpretation
of the contract and to avoid the decision on the merits since the parties
had bargained for arbitration rather than litigation.50
Although eager to facilitate the arbitrator's powers, in Sinclair Re-
" United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
15 See Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability,
85 HARV. L. REV. 636, 637 (1972) (the presumption in favor of arbitration should be
applied even to the interpretation of a contract's provisions regarding the scope of arbitral
authority such as the provisions excluding certain matters from the scope of arbitration).
4Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all of the questions
on which the parties disagree must therefore come within the scope of the griev-
ance and arbitration provisions of the collective agreement. The grievance
procedure is, in other words, a part of the continuous collective bargaining
process. It, rather than a strike, is the terminal point of a disagreement.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
41 The Court noted that: "[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be re-
solved in favor of coverage." Id. at 582-83 (footnote omitted).
4"The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all
questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining
whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the
contract." United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960).
"The labor arbitrator is more attuned to the law of the shop and can more adequately
interpret the labor contract. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960). Furthermore, if standard contract law were applicable, it would
enable the courts to reach the merits of the dispute and thereby eliminate the need for
arbitration. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 569 (1960).
50 The collective agreement requires arbitration of claims that courts might be
unwilling to entertain. In the context of the plant or industry the grievance may
assume proportions of which judges are ignorant. Yet, the agreement is to submit
all grievances to arbitration, not merely those that a court may deem to be meri-
torious.
The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance,
considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether
there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the
claim. The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those
which the court will deem meritorious. The processing of even frivolous claims
4431976]
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fining Co. v. Atkinson51 the Court retreated from a policy that would
have had the effect of compelling specific performance of no-strike
clauses. The Court instead adopted a literal and absolute reading of
section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia and declined to accommodate section 4
and section 301. It ruled that an injunction could not be issued to en-
join a strike, even if the strike constituted a breach of a collective
bargaining agreement.5 2  The Court reasoned that an injunction to en-
force a no-strike obligation was forbidden by the interdictions of section 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and distinguished Lincoln Mills5 on the
grounds that an injunction to compel specific performance of an agree-
ment to arbitrate was not an abuse which had prompted enactment of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent in Sinclair, contended that
this decision was inconsistent with the congressional policy favoring
the mutual enforceability of collective bargaining agreements since arbi-
tration clauses could be enforced but no-strike clauses could not. Fur-
theremore, he noted that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act had not impliedly repealed section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
may have therapeutic values of which those who are not a part of the plant
environment may be quite unaware.
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960) (footnotes
omitted).
The Court granted the arbitrator a certain amount of immunity from judicial review.
It stated:
[T~he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a ques-
tion for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for;
and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the
courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the con-
tract is different from his.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
Each of the collective bargaining agreements in the Steelworkers cases provided for
the arbitration of all disputes "as to the meaning, interpretation and application of the
provisions of the agreement." Noting the all-inclusive effect of these grievance-arbitration
clauses, the Court, in dicta, stated that a similar effect should be given to a no-strike
clause since one is the quid pro quo for the other. See United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
51 370 U.S. 195 (1961). The unions had struck over a grievance they were con-
tractually bound to arbitrate, and the employer sought to enjoin this activity. The district
court dismissed the complaint. This action was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, because the controversy constituted a labor dispute within the purview of Norris-
LaGuardia. The courts felt that section 4's general proscription against strike activity
precluded them from enjoining the strike. Id. at 199-200.
52 Id. at 209. The Court did not consider whether the two sections could be ac-
commodated, but only questioned whether section 301 impliedly repealed section 4. Id.
at 196. Compare Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353
U.S. 30 (1957) in which the Court held that the more specific provisions of the Railway
Labor Act could not be overridden by the more general provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text. The Court arrived at an
opposite conclusion in Sinclair, in which it construed the Norris-LaGuardia and Labor-
Management Relations Acts. Congressional inaction to accommodate the Acts was taken
to be a clear indication of the predominance of the broad and inclusive provisions of
Norris-LaGuardia. 370 U.S. at 202-03, 205, 215; contra, id. at 223 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Sinclair Court distinguished Chicago River on the basis that the Railway Labor
Act compelled the union to resort to the Railroad Adjustment Board for the settlement of
its "minor disputes," whereas no such procedure was provided for in the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act. Id. at 211.
-" See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text. 10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol25/iss4/3
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but that these two sections coexisted and therefore had to be accommo-
dated.54  Justice Brennan also reasoned that enjoining strike activity
might be the only way to compel the parties to submit an arbitrable griev-
ance to arbitration.55 Accordingly, he advocated accommodating sec-
tion 4 and section 301 to gain a perspective that was representative of
the contractual relationship between the parties. 56  To facilitate accom-
modation of the acts, Justice Brennan suggested that four conditions
should be fulfilled before issuance of a labor injunction: 57 1) the injunc-
tion must be appropriate notwithstanding Norris-LaGuardia; 2) the
parties must be bound by a collective bargaining agreement and the
strike must be over a grievance which the parties had agreed to arbi-
trate;58 3) the employer must be ordered to arbitrate as a condition
precedent to issuance of the injunction; and 4) the injunction must be
warranted under the ordinary principles of equity.59
The Court subsequently held, in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's,
Local 770,60 that sections 4 and 301 could be accommodated through
adoption of Justice Brennan's four-pronged formula. To foster the con-
gressional policy favoring enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments, the Court overruled Sinclair and held that a strike over an arbi-
trable grievance could be enjoined. Sinclair had frustrated rather than
furthered congressional policy,61 and the Court warned against viewing
congressional inaction to legislate on the Sinclair decision as tantamount
370 U.S. at 215-16.
, Id. at 216-17.
" Inability to enjoin a strike over an arbitrable grievance would demean the con-
tractual relationship between the parties and create a double standard of enjoinability:
the union would be able to obtain specific performance of the agreement to arbitrate
while the employer would be unable to obtain specific performance of the agreement not
to strike. The agreement not to strike over an arbitrable grievance has been equated
with the employer's duty to submit to the final and binding arbitration of labor disputes.
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 413 (1976) (Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall, Powell, JJ., dissenting).
57 370 U.S. at 228.
- The district court may only enjoin the strike pending arbitration when there is an
agreement to arbitrate that is mutually binding between the parties. Absent a mutually
binding obligation, a district court has no jurisdiction to enjoin acts involving or growing
out of a labor dispute. Martin Hageland, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., Cent. Dist. of
Cal., 460 F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1972) (injunction not issued).
" The ordinary equitable principles which were to be considered were "whether
breaches are occurring and will continue, or have been threatened and will be com-
mitted; whether they have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the employer,
and whether the employer will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will the
union from its issuance." 370 U.S. at 228.
- 398 U.S. 235 (1970). The company and the striking union were bound by a col-
lective bargaining agreement that contained a no-strike clause and a final and binding
arbitration provision. The grievance arbitration procedure provided that "any . ..dis-
pute between the parties ... involving the interpretation or application" of the agree-
ment would be settled by the grievance-arbitration procedures. The company and the
union disputed the use of non-union personnel in stocking the company's frozen food
shelves. The dispute was clearly arbitrable pursuant to the contract, but the union struck
and refused to submit to the company's demand for arbitration. The Court held that where
the strike was over a grievance the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate, the strike
could be enjoined, notwithstanding Norris-LaGuardia.
61 398 U.S. at 241.
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to acceptance of Sinclair.62 The Boys Markets injunction was care-
fully limited by the Court's "narrow" language which permitted injunc-
tions to issue only in situations which complied with the four conditions
expressed in Justice Brennan's dissent in the Sinclair case.6
Additionally, Sinclair would have been applied only in the federal
courts, since state court equity jurisdiction was unaffected by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. The expressed need for uniformity in the enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements among state and federal courts
would have thereby been thwarted. 4 Further, even if a state court in-
junction were issued, removal to federal district court could be easily.
obtained pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).5 The state court in-
junction would then be vacated because -of section 4's qualification on
federal court equity jurisdiction.
II. ACCOMMODATION AND THE SYMPATHY STRIKE SITUATION
A. Judge-Made Law
Labor law is hampered by a "vocabulary so freighted with ambiguity
[that it can easily lend itself] to a fictitious issue, by confounding as-
sumed conduct with the real conduct whose justifiability is in ques-
tion."66 Congress perpetuated this problem by enacting statutes with
specific intent but clouded by broad and inclusive terminology. The
courts, charged with statutory application, framed labor law principles
so as to clarify these ambiguities and essentially created "judge-made
law."6 7  The definition of statutory terms, such as "labor dispute,"
"terms and conditions of employment," and "promotion of industrial
peace," necessitated judicial interpretation and, at times, "judicial in-
vention."68  This clarification process required that the courts recognize
" The Boys Markets Court took judicial notice that Congress had still failed to take
any action to accommodate the Norris-LaGuardia and Labor-Management Relations Acts,
however, it rejected the supposition that congressional silence was indicative of congres-
sional acceptance of the policies propounded in Sinclair. This was diametrically opposed to
the approach taken by the Sinclair Court. See note 52 supra. The Boys Markets Court
also rejected the argument that the doctrine of stare decisis compelled a holding in accord-
ance with Sinclair. The Court noted that continuity and predictability in the law were
essential to the proper maintenance of domestic labor policies. It warned, however,
against mechanically adhering to the principles of the most recent case when those prin-
ciples no longer represented sound judgment or promoted a healthy labor policy. 398
U.S. at 240-42; contra, id. at 256 (Black, J., dissenting).
Congress did attempt to codify the Boys Markets holding in the building and construction
industry. See S. 924, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 4250, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977). The expressed effect would have been to enable any employer at a common situs
(multiple employers at one site) to obtain injunctive relief against any strike or picketing
in breach of a no-strike clause. Moreover, the strike had to be over an issue that was
subject to final and binding arbitration. The bill was defeated in the House. 35 CONe. Q.
521 (Mar. 26, 1977).
3 398 U.S. at 253-54.
See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968). See note 23 supra.
6 F. FRANFurmTa & N. GREE.NE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 35 (1930).
07 Id. at 203.
" See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
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the congressional policies and construe those policies in accordance with
the specific facts of the case.
6 9
The purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to alleviate the un-
fettered use of the federal injunction, for prior to enactment of the NLA,
federal courts had wantonly abused the injunction. By 1947, however,
congressional policy had shifted from the promotion of labor organiza-
tions to the enforcement of labor-management agreements. In so shift-
ing national labor policy Congress sought to "promote a higher degree
of responsibility [between] the parties . . . and . . . [to] promote in-
dustrial peace."70  Congress decided to enforce labor contracts through
the "usual processes of the law, 7 1 and granted the federal courts broad
equitable and legal jurisdiction over alleged violations of such contracts
pursuant to section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act.
The scope of judicial inquiry was subsequently limited, however,
in deference to the congressional policy which favored settlement through
arbitration, preferring the arbitrator's decision on the merits to judical
determinations based on ordinary contract principles.72  Arbitration be-
came recognized as the major motifin the settlement of labor-manage-
ment disputes and thereby emerged as the principal method of in-
terpreting and resolving ambiguities in the parties' collective bargaining
agreement.
In Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, Bakery Workers,73 the Supreme Court
affirmed a Second Circuit decision to stay an action for damages result-
ing from an alleged breach of a no-strike clause, pending an arbitrator's
decision whether the clause had been violated. The Court considered a
dispute concerning an alleged breach of a no-strike clause, in a contract
containing all-pervasive no-strike and arbitration provisions, so funda-
mental to the interpretation of the contract that arbitration was man-
dated. The alleged breach of the no-strike clause would not, in turn,
relieve the employer of his duty to arbitrate under the contract. The
questioned activity would have to be expressly excluded from arbitration
coverage before such a conclusion could bereached.7 4  Unless expressly
excluded, it would be presumed that the parties intended that an arbi-
trator rather than a court decide whether the activity was in violation of
the no-strike clause.
Analogizing to the sympathy strike situation, the decision in Drake
implies that a striking union, if requested by the employer to submit to
6 See Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 266 (1962) (each
case must be handled on the basis of its own facts and not answered in the abstract or in
general terms).
7 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947).
71 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947).
72 See note 44-50 supra and accompanying text.
r 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
74 Id. at 258-66. The parties had agreed to submit all disputes "involving questions
of interpretation or application" of the agreement to the designated grievance-arbitration
provisions. The company and the union disagreed on the question of whether the union
had violated the no-strike clause. Because the alleged violation of the no-strike clause was
an issue of contract interpretation, the dispute fell within the broad parameters of the
arbitration provision, unless expressly excluded from coverage. The company, therefore,
1976]
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arbitration under a final and binding arbitration clause, must arbitrate
the question whether a contractual no-strike clause encompassed the
otherwise protected right of union members to respect a picket line.
The union may not, under this interpretation, continue the strike and rely
on its own contractual interpretation. The Drake rationale would equally
suffice to deny an employer's prayer for injunctive relief if the employer
had not first agreed to arbitration concerning the alleged violation.
The sympathy strike situation, however, complicates the systematic
application of Drake. The employer seeks to enforce the no-strike clause
by asking the court to enjoin the sympathy strike pending arbitration of
the question whether the sympathy strike, in fact, constitutes a viola-
tion of that no-strike clause. The situation is also complicated by the
fact that sympathy strikes can create a need for immediate injunctive
relief because of the potential for a chain reaction among related in-
dustries. The employer, rather than waiting for the strike to terminate
and then estimating damages, seeks an immediate suspension of the
strike activity through judicial enforcement of the no-strike clause and
the parties' quid pro quo. Enforcement of the no-strike obligation also
hampered by the conflict between the seemingly all-inclusive prohibition
of injunctions in section 4, and the broad grant of federal equity juris-
diction in section 301(a). Although both statutes apply to a labor dis-
pute arising out of an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the results reached under each approach may be diametrically
opposed. While section 4 severely curtails a district court's jurisdiction
to issue injunctions, section 301(a) provides a federal forum in which to
enforce labor contracts without an express or implied limit on the use of
the injunctive remedy.
B. Application of Boys Markets to Sympathy Strikes
Boys Markets was a landmark decision for several reasons. The
decision balanced Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction policies with the
Labor-Management Relations Act's policy of promoting the enforce-
ment of collective bargaining agreements, and it demonstrated that the
prohibition against injunctions was neither inveterate, nor inapposite
to contemporary labor-management relations.75  In order to effectuate
the parties' quid pro quo and to promote the congressional policy favor-
ing the arbitration of labor-management disputes, the Court held that
the injunction ban of section 4 did not preclude the enjoining of a strike
over an arbitrable grievance. The decision enumerated the requisite
conditions for issuance of injunctions and thereby restrained federal
was required to submit its damage claims to the arbitrator since that was the forum the
parties had agreed upon in their contract.
15 The Boys Markets Court, 398 U.S. at 250-53, noted that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
"was responsive to a situation totally different from that which exists today," but also
stated that its holding was only applicable in situations in which a contract contained an
express mandatory grivance-arbitration clause. Therefore, the Court emphasized that the
decision was not to be construed as undermining the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Several commentators, however, have suggested that there is a need to re-evaluate the
contemporary utility of Norris-LaGuardia. See, e.g., Gregory, The Law of the Collective
Agreement, 57 MIcH. L. REV. 635, 645-46 n.39 (1959); Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in
the Federal Courts, 59 MICH. L. Rxv. 673, 681-85 (1961).
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courts from re-entering "the labor injunction business." 76  Finally, the
holding limited th injunctive remedy to instances in which the parties
were bound by a collective bargaining agreement containing a mandatory
grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure. 77  The determination of
the bounds of its directive that "injunctive relief would not be appro-
priate in every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance," 7 however,
was resigned to subsequent interpretations.
In Boys Markets, the union had a clearly arbitrable grievance with
the company. When the union struck over this grievance instead of sub-
mitting it to the mandatory grievance-arbitration procedure, the strike
constituted an enjoinable contract violation. The facts of the sympathy
strike case, however, are distinguishable from those in Boys Markets by
virtue of the nature of the sympathy strike: the sympathy strike occurs
after a picket line has been established, when strikers refuse to cross the
line in deference to the picketers. 79  Hence, the sympathy strike situa-
tion lacks an underlying grievance between strikers and the employer
seeking injunctive relief. The dispute arises after the strike has begun,
when the strikers and the employer disagree with respect to the legality
of the strike. 0 Therefore, even when the labor contract encompasses
an all-inclusive arbitration provision, the dispute is only arguably ar-
bitrable and not conclusively arbitrable as appears to be required by the
Boys Markets command that to be enjoinable the strike must be "over
a grievance the parties are contractually bound to arbitrate."8 1
The holding of Boys Markets, therefore, did not necessitate a finding
that a sympathy strike was enjoinable prior to a determination by the
arbitrator concerning the legality of the strike. District courts had to
interpret the rule of Boys Markets, as well as the spirit and reasoning
underlying its accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia and the Labor-
Management Relations Acts, to decide whether to permit an injunction
pending an arbitrator's decision regarding the legality of the sympathy
strike.
16 See note 7 supra; F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCrION 200 (1930).
77 398 U.S. at 253.
7s Id. at 253-54.
79 Judge Hunter's dissenting opinion in NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauf-
feurs, Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 326 n.6 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974), sug-
gested a way in which the sympathy strike could fit within the Boys Markets situation.
In addition to striking until the picketing terminated, the strikers would have to demand
that the company recognize their right to honor a picket line. The recognition demand
would constitute an economic means employed to compel settlement of an arbitrable is-
sue, and therefore, if the labor contract contained a mandatory arbitration procedure, the
sympathy strike would be enjoinable pursuant to Boys Markets.
s0 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975).
81 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970). A contrary point of view was expressed in Valmac Indus.,
Inc. v. Food Handlers, Local 425, 519 F.2d 267-68 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 906
(1976). Judge Webster, writing for the Eighth Circuit, stated that "[i]t makes little sense
to argue that because the work stoppage precipitated the dispute it was not a work stoppage
'over' a grievance which the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate." Contra,
NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeaurs, Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 330 (3d Cir.)
(Hunter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974). Judge Hunter strenously
argued against enjoining the strike based on the fact that a sympathy strike is not the
cause of a dispute but rather, in the normal strike situation, the result of an underlying
dispute. 15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
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C. Development of Anti-Injunction and Pro-Injunction Philosophies
Uncertainty in the judicial application of the Boys Markets standards
to sympathy strikes led to inconsistent conclusions throughout the cir-
cuits. The problem concerned interpretation of the Boys Markets com-
mand that a strike could be enjoined only when it was "over a grievance
the parties [were] contractually bound to arbitrate."8 2  The Court did not
specify whether the dispute must precipitate the work stoppage or
whether the dispute could develop indirectly from the strike over a
grievance that resulted from the work stoppage.
Several courts, including the Second Circuit in Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers, denied district court jurisdiction to enjoin the strike
on the ground that the strike was not over a grievance which the parties
were contractually bound to arbitrate.83 These courts interpreted the
sympathy strike as merely being a response to another union's picket line,
not caused by any "underlying" dispute between the employer and the
striking employees.8 4 Thus, their application of Boys Markets was
strict and literal, denying the injunction in any case that failed to repre-
sent an exact replica of Boys Markets. Moreover, they held the injunc-
tion was inappropriate since the dispute with the sympathy strikers
would ultimately be resolved by arbitration of the employer-picketer
dispute; hence, accommodation was not necessary in this type of
82 398 U.S. at 254.
83 In the Second Circuit: Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207
(2d Cir. 1975), aff'd 428 U.S. 397 (1976) (preliminary injunction improper pending
arbitration on the legality of the sympathy strike because the strike did not concern a
grievance which the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate); but see Barnard Col-
lege v. Transport Workers, 372 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (preliminary injunction
against sympathy strikers proper, since the dispute over the legality of the strike entailed
an "interpretation or application" of the collective bargaining agreement).
In the Fifth Circuit: Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th
Cir. 1972) (district court without jurisdiction to enjoin sympathy strike, since the strike
was merely precipitated by the picket lines and, therefore, did not constitute a strike over
a grievance that the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate; injunction permissible
only if the dispute underlying the strike is arbitrable between the company and the
sympathy strikers); see also United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d
1236 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976) (a "memorial" strike is not en-
joinable pursuant to Boys Markets because the strike was not over an arbitrable grievance,
and scope of the prospective injunction too closely resembled the result that Norris-
LaGuardia had intended to alleviate).
In the Sixth Circuit: Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union
53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1976) (Boys Markets in-
junction cannot be extended to include strikes which did not originate from an under-
lying grievance between the employer and the strikers. A sympathy strike did not arise
from an underlying grievance and was not enjoinable. Moreover, the court found the strik-
ers had proven their personal safety would be jeopardized if they attempted to cross
the lines).
84 This sentiment was aptly stated in Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
468 F.2d 1372, 1373 (5th Cir. 1972):
The strike by the Chalmette employees was not "over a grievance" which the
parties were contractually bound to arbitrate. Rather, the strike itself precipi-
tated the dispute - the validity under the Union's no-strike obligation of the
member-employees honoring the ILA picket line. Were we to hold that the legal-
ity of the very strike sought to be enjoined in the present situation constituted
a sufficiently arbitrable underlying dispute for a Boys Markets injunction to is-
sue, it is difficult to conceive of any strike which could not be so enjoined. 16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol25/iss4/3
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strlke.8 Other courts8" relied on the Steelworkers Trilogy's "presump-
tion of arbitrability 87 to construe the dispute over the legality of the
strike as one which the parties were "contractually bound to arbitrate."8
85 For a detailed analysis of the practical considerations counteracting the use of
the injunction as a remedy to halting sympathy strikes, see Note, Federal Courts May
Enjoin Work Stoppage When its Legality is an Arbitrable Issue, 88 HAav. L. REv. 464
(1974). The author noted that in NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs,
Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974), the unions had
reserved the right to refuse to cross primary picket lines. The injunction of the work stop-
page, pending an arbitrator's ruling on the status of the picket line, created a new obliga-
tion which undermined this right rather than enforced the union's promise not to respect
secondary picket lines. 88 HAv. L. REV. at 467.
86 In the Third Circuit Island Creek Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 507 F.2d 650
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975) (preliminary injunction issued pending
arbitration over whether the union had impliedly bargained away its right to honor stranger
picket lines. The court enjoined the strike and held that the question whether the strike
violated the contract was subject to the all-encompassing arbitration provisions which even
extended to "matters not specifically mentioned" in the contract. The court stated that
if an employee had been discharged for honoring the picket line, the union could have
submitted this dispute to arbitration; thus the court avoided construction of a double stan-
dard of arbitrability); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs, Local 926, 502 F.2d
321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974) (preliminary injunction issued pending
arbitrator's decision whether the picket line was primary or secondary).
In the Fourth Circuit: Windsor Power House Coal Co. v. District 6, UMW, 530 F.2d
312 (4th Cir. 1976) (preliminary injunction entered against union that refused to cross
stranger picket line at petitioner-company); Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 505
F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975) (refusal to cross picket lines
held to be arbitrable issue and was properly enjoined); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v.
Teamsters, Local 391, 497 F.2d 311 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (prelimi-
nary injunction issued and case remanded to district court to determine whether injunc-
tion should continue pending arbitrator's decision regarding the relationship between
the no-strike clause and a contract clause affording union members the right to honor a
primary picket line); Wilmington Shipping Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 86
LRRM 2846 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974) (injunction issued);
Monongahela Power Co. v. Local No. 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973) (dis-
pute over legality of sympathy strikes was subject to mandatory arbitration; statutory
right to strike was waived by union agreement to no-strike clause).
In the Seventh Circuit: Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir.
1974) (broad terms of arbitration provisions established union's duty to arbitrate whether
its members could refuse to cross a picket line); but see Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing
& Lifting Machine Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976)
(refusal to cross picket lines not an arbitrable dispute; injunction denied); Gary Hobart
Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975) (sym-
pathy strikers were not bound to arbitrate the underlying issue of the picketer's grievance
with the company, whereby the sympathy strike was not enjoinable).
In the Eighth Circuit: Associated Gen. Contractors v. International Union of Operating
Eng'rs, Local 49, 519 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1975) (injunction issued); Valmac Indus. v. Food
Handlers, Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 906 (1976) (injunc-
tion issued, but conditioned on prompt arbitration); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, 442 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (ques-
tion of legality of sympathy strike constituted a "minor dispute" within Railway Labor
Act and strike could be enjoined to preserve status quo pending arbitration); but see
Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. Thacker, 394 F. Supp. 715 (W.D. Wash. 1975) (temporary
restraining order denied because the refusal to cross was held to be only arguably illegal,
whereas in Boys Markets the union action was a patent violation of the contract; how-
ever, work stoppage enjoinable where the strike clearly violated agreement and would
cause irreparable injury, notwithstanding the "over a grievance" requirement).
87 For a discussion on the Steelworkers Trilogy and the presumption of arbitrability,
see notes 44-50 supra and accompany text.
88 See Parade Publications, Inc. v. Philadelphia Mailers, No. 14, 459 F.2d 369 (3d
Cir. 1972). In this case, plaintiff failed to allege a dispute which the parties were con-
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These courts based their decisions upon the breadth of the manda-
tory arbitration provisions, and heeded the admonitions set forth in the
Steelworkers Trilogy: to deny arbitration only upon positive assurance
that the dispute was not arbitrable;89 to solely look to the face of the
contract to determine the arbitrability of the grievance;90 and to resolve
all doubts of arbitrability in favor of arbitration. 91 Because this narrow
inquiry prevented the courts from positively concluding that sympathy
strikes were excluded from arbitration, they enjoined the strike pending
the arbitrator's decision reasoning that the right to strike would not be
eradicated, but merely suspended. 92  Stressing the importance of the
injunction as the only effective way to enforce an agreement to arbi-
trate,93 these courts interpreted the "over a grievance" clause to meet
the facts of the sympathy strike case.94 More specifically, they avoided
tractually bound to arbitrate, merely alleging the continuing work stoppage violated the
no-strike clause. The court held that both an underlying arbitrable issue and a no-strike
clause are prerequisite to issuance of a Boys Markets injunction. Id. at 373. In deter-
mining the arbitrability of the issue, however, especially where the arbitration clauses
are broad in scope, the party seeking the injunction "is entitled to the benefit of the
strong presumption in favor of arbitrability . . ." Id. at 374 (quoting AVCO Corp. v.
Local 787, Int'l Union, 459 F.2d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 1972)).
" See note 46 supra.
90 See note 48 supra.
91 See note 47 supra.
92 Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Food Handlers, Local 425, 519 F.2d 263, 267-78 (8th Cir.
1975); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs, Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 324
(3d Cir. 1974). The belief that the injunction would effectively terminate the strike was
expounded in F. FRANICKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCrION 201 (1930); Note,
Federal Courts May Enjoin Work Stoppage When its Legality is an Arbitrable Issue, 88
HARV. L. REv. 464, 470 (1974).
The right to engage in a sympathy strike is statutorily protected but such a right may
be bargained away. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80 (1953).
In Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 287, 288-89 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 925 (1975), the court required that the waiver be in "clear and unmistakable
language;" but see Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1214
(4th Cir. 1973) finding that the right to refuse to cross the picket line "was waived . . .
by the . . . union in agreeing to a no-strike clause."
11 Boys Markets noted that the injunction was the most expeditious means to end an
illegal strike; whereas an action for damages after the dispute has been settled, or an ac-
tion for the discharge of the striking employees would only exacerbate an already tense
situation. 398 U.S. at 248-49. See also Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
453-56 (1957).
94 For the most part, these cases have avoided becoming enmeshed in the "over a
grievance" interpetation and have rested their opinions on the all-inclusive breadth of the
arbitration clauses. The Court in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960) expressly stated that arbitration could only be denied if the particular
dispute was excluded from mandatory arbitration but that all "doubts should be resolved
in favor of coverage." Id. at 583.
Therefore, the district court in Barnard College v. Transport Workers, 372 F. Supp. 211,
212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), held that it was impossible to positively determine whether the
violation of a no-strike clause was arbitrable when the contract provided that "[g]riev-
ances shall be deemed to consist only of disputes arising out of the interpretation or
application of this agreement." Id. at 212.
The Barnard court, however, reinterpreted the "over a grievance" requirement by
noting that the collective bargaining agreement contained a mandatory arbitration pro-
vision and that the "dispute [was] one that both parties [were] contractually bound to
arbitrate." ld. at 213. The same result was reached in the Monongahela Power Co. v.
Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1214 (4th Cir. 1973).
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an application of this clause which considered the requirement a fatal
defect to the enjoining of sympathy strikes.
Thus, two schools of thought evolved, each propounding the limited
scope of a district court's inquiry in a labor dispute. The anti-injunction
school held that even broad and all-inclusive arbitration clauses would
not obviate the fact that there was no underlying grievance between the
parties; a condition precedent to issuance under a literal application of
Boys Markets. The pro-injunction school, presumed coverage within
all-encompassing arbitration provisions, and thus granted the injunc-
tion in accordance with the Supreme Court directives in the Steelworkers
Trilogy.
1. The Pro-Injunction School
The pro-injunction school contended that issuance of the injunction
would expedite mandatory arbitration and preserve the integrity and
mutual enforceability of the contract. Moreover, the injunction would
neither impinge upon nor judicially repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
which sought to promote labor organizations and collective bargaining;
hence, enforcement of the contract would actually bolster the intent of
that Act, by preserving the agreement into which the parties freely
entered. Finally, they reasoned that the foundation of the Supreme
Court's decision in Boys Markets rested upon preservation of the con-
tractual relations between the parties.
The pro-injunction school's application of Boys Markets is exempli-
fied by Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2392, IBEW.95 The parties
had agreed to peaceably settle any dispute concerning "the interpreta-
tion, application, or claimed violation" of the contract through man-
datory grievance-arbitration procedures. Local 2392 began a work
stoppage to honor the picket lines of a sister local. After the employer
unsuccessfully attempted to submit the dispute to the contractual
grievance procedure, 96 the company instituted a section 301 action.
The employer requested injunctive relief and damages on the grounds
that the sympathy strike violated the no-strike clause 97 and constituted
an arbitrable grievance. The union claimed that it had not authorized
the strike but that individual employees were merely exercising their
section 7 right to refuse to cross the picket line;98 however, the union
9 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973).
" The adjustment of grievance clause provided that -[a]ny dispute . . . with respect.
to the interpretation, application, or claimed violation" would be settled by the parties'
grievance arbitration provisions. Id. at 1210 (emphasis in original).
oY The no-strike clause broadly prohibited strikes, work stoppages, or any "interfer-
ence with or impeding of work." It further prohibited union authorization of such activ-
ity and required that, upon company notification of a no-strike clause violation, the union
should terminate all unauthorized activity by its members.
' 484 F.2d at 1211. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1970), generally provides employees with the right to organize and join labor unions,
to bargain collectively and to "engage in other concerted activites for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities."
1976]
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was unable to prove this assertion.99 The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in reversing the district court's denial of the injunction, found that
the facts of the case "clearly [brought] it within the narrow Boys Markets
exception" to the Norris-LaGuardia ban on the use of injunctions. 00
The Monongahela court viewed the broad language of the contract
as indicative of the parties' intention not to exclude this particular dispute
from arbitration, and therefore held that the alleged violation of a no-
strike clause was included within the scope of the arbitration provision.
The court thus applied the "presumption of arbitrability" to the dispute
over the legality of the sympathy strike and stated that the dispute was
so clearly arbitrable that the strike would have been enjoined even had
there been a presumption against arbitrability. 10 1  The court further
emphasized that the quid pro quo doctrine necessitated that the union
submit to the mandatory grievance procedures rather than strike.
0 2
Lastly, the court held that the injunction pending arbitration was founded
upon ordinary principles of equity.1l 1 The Monongahela court con-
cluded that the sympathy strike was enjoinable pursuant to the reason-
ing behind Boys Markets because even though the facts differed, there
was nevertheless a grievance which both parties were contractually bound
to arbitrate.1
0 4
The contract in Monongahela contained an express no-strike clause.
Some courts, however, have issued the injunction notwithstanding the
absence of such an express no-strike obligation. These courts main-
tained that an obligation to submit grievances to final and binding arbi-
tration implied a concomitant obligation not to strike over an arbitrable
dispute. 105
99 Id. at 1214-15.
100 Id. at 1213.
101 Id. at 1214 n.13.
102 Id. at 1214.
103 Boys Markets noted that the following equitable principles should be considered
in determining whether to issue an injunction to enforce an alleged no-strike clause vio-
lation: -whether breaches [of contract] are occurring and will continue, or have been
threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused or will cause irreparable in-
jury to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from the denial of an
injunction than will the union from its issuance." 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970) (quoting
the dissent in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962)).
104 484 F.2d at 124; see note 96 supra.
105 Several Supreme Court policy considerations permitted this implication. The
implication is primarily based on the equation, in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, that
an employer's agreement to submit disputes to mandatory grievance-arbitration proce-
dures is the quid pro quo for the union's no-strike obligation. 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
Further support, however, is suggested by the holding in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas
Flour Co., where a contract containing a mandatory arbitration provision impliedly con-
tained a no-strike pledge with respect to arbitrable disputes. 369 U.S. 95, 104-06 (1962)
(the employer's breach of contract suit, brought under section 301, was upheld against
the union for strike damages due to a walkout over an arbitrable dispute). And by the
holding in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, which implied a no-strike clause
as coexistent with a mandatory grievance-arbitration procedure in a Boys Markets injunc-
tion suit. 414 U.S. 368, 382-84 (1974). (In Gateway, the Court held that the federal
policy favoring arbitration permitted an injunction in a dispute concerning safety condi-
tions at the place of employment, as such questions were based upon contract interpreta-
tion.) Id. at 376-77.
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In Island Creek Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 10 6 the district
court implied a no-strike pledge as coexisting with the all-encompassing
grievance-arbitration provisions of the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1971.107 The court enjoined a sympathy strike pending
arbitration on the scope of the implied no-strike clause. The agreement
provided for arbitration of any dispute "as to the meaning and applica-
tion of the provisions of this agreement," or "matters not specifically
mentioned in the agreement," as well as "any local trouble of any kind
arising at the mine."' 08  The Island court held that the contract was
silent on the question whether the union had contracted away the rights
of its members to honor a stranger picket line. 1' 9 While there was no
specific waiver of the right to honor a picket line in the agreement, the
court ruled that an injunction should issue to force settlement of the
dispute over the legality of the strike by arbitration rather than by eco-
nomic warfare."0 This decision was reached on the grounds that the
scope of the implied no-strike clause should be equivalent to that of the
express, all-encompassing grievance-arbitration provisions."'
The pro-injunction school concluded that the combined effect of the
presumption of arbitrability and the quid pro quo underlying the Boys
Markets decision furnished the courts with jurisdiction to enjoin the
strike pending arbitration of its legality. Therefore, this school deter-
mined that it would not positively rule that the no-strike question was
excluded from the scope of mandatory arbitration. In order to comply
with its quid pro quo, the union could not legally strike prior to the
arbitrator's determination that such activity was proper. Furthermore,
noting that the injunction was an equitable remedy and that Boys Mar-
kets required consideration of equitable factors, the pro-injunction
106 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975).
'u7 The court noted the grievance-arbitration provisions were "virtually identical" to the
provisions construed in Gateway, 507 F.2d at 651; see note 106 supra.
'0 Id. at 651.
'0 Id. at 653. Similarly, the court concluded the union could have arbitrated the dis-
charge of a union member who honored the picket lines, pursuant to the adjustment of
grievances provisions. The court reasoned that in either the discharge case or the injunc-
tion case, the arbitrator would have to determine whether the right to respect picket lines
had been waived.
110 The court qualified the injunctive powers it had assumed and concluded that its
approach should not be applied in every case which implied a no-strike clause. It based
its opinion on the all-encompassing arbitration provisions which permitted arbitration to
resolve disputes over matters not mentioned in the agreement. Id. at 653-54.
Accord, Windsor Power House Coal Co. v. District 6, UMW, 530 F.2d 312 (4th Cir.
1976); Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (4th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975); Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293,
299-300 (7th Cir. 1974); Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372,
1373 (5th Cir. 1972); Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 375 F. Supp. 980,
981 (W.D. Pa. 1974). Cf. United States Steel v. United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 1129,
1247 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976) (company remedy for a secondary
boycott afforded in terms of a section 10(1) injunction or a section 303 damage suit);
see also Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 457 F.2d 162, 164 (7th Cir. 1972) (broad
mandatory arbitration provisions imply a pro tanto obligation not to strike).
" 507 F.2d at 654.
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school issued the injunction only after finding the employer would suf-
fer irreparable harm should the union's concerted activity continue."2
The pro-injunction school's use of the presumption of arbitrability,
however, facilitated enjoining arguably protected union activity. In this
sense, the pro-injunction school's approach somewhat frustrated the
basic premise of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which was to eliminate the
unfettered use of the federal injunction. Moreover, this school's equa-
tion that a dispute "arising over a strike" was tantamount to a strike
"over a grievance," strained the scope of Boys Markets "narrow hold-
ing." In effect, the equation was a justification for a result which could
not have been reached through a literal interpretation of Boys Markets.
2. The Anti-Injunction School
By contrast, the yistrict court in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steel-
workers held that Boys Markets did not apply to the sympathy strike
situation since "there [was] no arbitrable grievance between the
parties."" 3 Depicting the actual dispute as the grievance between the
company and the original picketers which precipitated the work stop-
page, the court subordinated the dispute over the legality of the sym-
pathy strike to that primary grievance." 4  The court, therefore, con-
cluded that the strike was not "over a grievance" which the parties
were contractually bound to arbitrate." 5 Adopting the viewpoint pre-
sented in Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,"6 the district
court in Buffalo Forge held that the Boys Markets injunction was in-
applicable to sympathy strikes, since issuance of injunctions under
those circumstances would undermine the viability of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act and a wide panoply of strikes could become enjoinable
should such precedent be established."
7
The finding in Buffalo Forge, that the controversy entailed no arbi-
trable dispute displays the court's apparent confusion of the standards of
arbitrability as enunciated in the Steelworkers Trilogy with the Boys
Markets standards of enjoinability. Boys Markets might have indirect-
ly bolstered the congressional policy favoring arbitration, but its holding
related to the enjoining of strikes that thwart the arbitration process.
The policy considerations concerning the arbitrability of disputes were
outlined in the Steelworkers Trilogy."8  If the court, in fact, ruled that
11 See Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 1129, 1133-34 (4th Cir.
1974); Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 1974); Bethle-
hem Mines Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 375 F. Supp. 980, 984 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
11 386 F. Supp. 405, 409 (1974).
'4 Id. at 410.
I' See Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union 53, 520 F.2d
1220, 1227 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1976) (the court stated that
"there is a clear difference between a labor dispute which results from a work stoppage
and a work stoppage which is the result of a labor dispute arising from conditions of em-
ployment").
116 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972); see note 84 supra.
"7 386 F. Supp. at 410.
"s See notes 44-50 supra and accompanying text.
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the dispute over the legality of the strike was not arbitrable, this would
constitute a restriction of the presumption of arbitrability, particularly
since the labor contract provided for arbitration of questions involving
the very "meaning and application" of the agreement. If the court
merely concluded that the strike Was not enjoinable because the dispute
did not precipitate the strike, then it essentially made a pure applica-
tion of Boys Markets.
The appellate court affirmed the district court decision, and held
that the strike was not over a grievance with Buffalo Forge but was
"simply a manifestation of the striking workers' deference to other em-
ployees' picket lines.""' 9  The court further surmised that if this type of
strike were enjoined, pursuant to the Boys Markets formula, the issuance
of the injunction would, in effect, repeal section 4 of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act. 120  Moreover, the court did not consider its decision anti-
thetical to the policies of the Labor-Management Relations Act.'
2
'
Primarily focusing on the issues of law rather than the particular facts
of the case, the court regarded Boys Markets as the seminal and termi-
nal point of consideration. It denied the injunction even though the
adjustment of grievances section in the parties' contract provided that
"[s]hould differences arise ... as to the interpretation and application
of . . . this Agreement, or should any trouble of any kind arise in the
plant, there shall be no suspension of work on account of such differ-
ences."12
Several other practical considerations, notwithstanding Boys Markets,
shaped the court's decision. Notable was the dissenting opinion of
Judge Hunter in NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs,
Local 926.123 Judge Hunter classified this type of strike as one that
was not an attempt to compel the company to forego arbitration of an
arbitrable dispute since the sympathy strike was the cause rather than
the result of the dispute and thus determined that enjoining the strike
would not affect the ultimate outcome of the dispute.2 4  He noted that
19 517 F.2d 1207, 1210 (2d Cir. 1975).
120 Id. at 1211.
121 Accord, Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union 53, 520 F.2d
1220, 1221-22 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1976) (refusal to cross a
picket line because of bona fide fear of physical harm is an exception to an express or
implied no-strike obligation. Id. at 1228); see Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505
F.2d 293, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1974) (Fairfield, J., dissenting); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Auto-
motive Chauffeurs, Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 325 (3d Cir.) (Hunter, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974); but see Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414
U.S. 386 (1974) (court enjoined a work stoppage over a safety dispute notwithstanding
section 502 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970), which en-
titles an employee to refuse to work if abnormally dangerous conditions exist at his place
of employment); Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 1972) (con-
tract was silent as to whether employees were required to work overtime at the em-
ployer's request, but the strong presumption of arbitrability necessitated enjoining the
employees from refusing to work overtime until the arbitrator interpreted the contract).
12 386 F. Supp. 405, 4Y7 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
12- 502 F.2d 321, 325 (3d Cir.) (Hunter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049
(1974).
124 502 F.2d at 326.
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even though the legality of the strike might be an arbitrable dispute,
the "cause-effect" relationship between the dispute and the strike was
lacking. 25 Hence, pursuant to a "mechanical" application of Boys
Markets, the strike could not be enjoined. 128 In vigorously arguing
against enjoining the sympathy strike, Judge Hunter further reasoned
that an injunction would effectuate the tautology that arbitrability would
be treated as tantamount to enjoinability. 12 7 This analysis inevitably
led to the conclusion that any doubt concerning the legality of the sym-
pathy strike should be resolved in favor of strict application of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. 128
While the majority in NAPA decided to enjoin the strike and compel
arbitration of the dispute, Judge Hunter theorized that the issuance of
the injunction would actually discourage arbitration in that the em-
ployer having obtained the injunction and the end of the work stoppage,
would have nothing more to gain from arbitration. Arbitration would
only present the employer with the precarious possibility that he might
eventually lose on the merits. 29 The statutory rights of employees to
respect a picket line were regarded as more compelling than the em-
ployees' "arguable" contractual responsibility to cross the lines.130
The anti-injunction school, refusing to enjoin the strike because it
was not "over a grievance the parties [were] contractually bound to
arbitrate," defined the "dispute" as the grievance between the em-
ployer and the picketers, and thus relegated the sympathy strike dispute
to a subordinate and incidental status.' 3' The anti-injunction courts
125 Id. at 330-31.
126 Id. at 333.
127 Id. at 325. See text at note 118 supra. Judge Hunter viewed the sympathy strike
as arbitrable but expressly rejected enjoining the strike solely on the basis of its arbitra-
bility. He further stated that,
[Tihis dispute was never an "underlying cause" of the Local 926 work stop-
page since it arose after that work stoppage had begun and never became a
basis for its continuation. As a result, the strike never deterred the arbitration
of this issue and the existence of this dispute never provided a basis for the is-
suance of an injunction under the holding in Boys Markets.
Id. at 331 (footnote omitted).
128 See Note, The Applicability of Boys Markets Injunctions to Refusals to Cross a
Picket Line, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 113, 138 (1976); see generally Note, Federal Courts May
Enjoin Work Stoppage When its Legality is an Arbitrable Issue, 88 RAiiV. L. REV. 464
(1974).
129 502 F.2d at 327-28. Judge Hunter's portentions were partially realized when an
employer was granted an injunction pending arbitration but subsequently refused to arbi-
trate. The court thereupon ordered the employer to arbitrate within ten days, empha-
sizing that the purpose of the injunction was to compel the parties to submit the dispute
to arbitration and avoid the economic consequences of a work stoppage. Valmac Indus.,
Inc. v. Food Handlers, Local 425, 519 F.2d 263, 268-69 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated on other
grounds, 428 U.S. 906 (1976).
130 The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80
(1953), held that a worker's statutory right to strike had been waived by a no-strike
clause that did not specifically permit the employee to honor a picket line. The em-
ployee's breach of the clause was sufficient reason for his discharge. Justice Black dis-
sented on the ground that the Labor-Management Relations Act had recognized the tra-
ditional right to respect picket lines and had statutorily sanctioned this activity. He ar-
gued the majority decision contravened that right. Id. at 81.
iM' The Buffalo Forge Court noted that:
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sacrificed compelling immediate resolution of a continuing controversy
through arbitration for a mechanical application of the Boys Markets
requirements.1 32  The strikers were assured of their statutory right to
honor picket lines, notwithstanding their arguable violation of the no-
strike clause.
The problem of accommodating the divergencies between the Norris-
LaGuardia and the Labor-Management Relations Acts emerged as a
matter for congressional attention, however, subsequent to the Boys
Markets decision, Congress did not state its opinion on the accommo-
dation. Cognizant of the resulting controversy among the circuits, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 33 to determine whether the Boys Markets ac-
commodation could be applied to sympathy strikes.
III. THE Buffalo Forge DECISION
Buffalo Forge afforded the Court the opportunity to reinterpret the
contemporary utility of Norris-LaGuardia's injunction ban and to rede-
fine the current availability of the injunction as a tool for enforcing col-
lective bargaining agreements. The Court, however, refused to extend the
area that it previously carved out of Norris-LaGuardia and thus con-
cluded that the Boys Markets exception to section 4 did not apply to
sympathy strikes. It held that Norris-LaGuardia's ban on injunctions
was still responsive to a worker's right to honor a picket line, notwith-
standing a labor contract's broad no-strike obligation.
In following the presumption in favor of arbitration, the Court noted
that the alleged violation of the no-strike clause was arbitrable;1
34
therefore, the arbitration process would have to be summoned to deter-
mine the legality of the strike before any injunction could issue.' 35
Noting that the company did not refute the allegations that it had not re-
quested arbitration, the Court held that the injunction could issue only
after the employer submitted the question to arbitration and the strike
had been found to be violative of the no-strike clause. 136
This statement seems to be procedurally consistent with the Court's
holding in Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, in which a
Boys Markets plainly does not control this case . . . . The strike at issue was a
sympathy strike in support of sister unions negotiating with the employer;
neither its causes nor the issue underlying it were subject to the settlement
procedures provided by the contract between the employer and respondents.
The strike had neither the purpose nor the effect of denying or evading an obli-
gation to arbitrate or of depriving the employer of his bargain.
428 U.S. at 407-08.
132 See NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs, Local 926, 502 F.2d 321,
333 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
423 U.S. 911 (1975).
134 428 U.S. 397, 405, 409-10 (1976).
135 Id. at 411.
131 Id. at 410. The Union argued that the employer faied to invoke the arbitration
process and therefore should not be entitled to the injunction. 517 F.2d at 1209 n.4.
The Supreme Court, in its aflirmance of the appellate court's decision not to enjoin the
strike, did not reach this issue. 428 U.S. at 401 n.3.
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company's section 301 suit for damages was stayed pending an arbitra-
tor's decision whether the no-strike clause had been violated.137 Drake
stated that when a contract provided for mandatory arbitration, the arbi-
tration process was so fundamental that even an alleged "repudiation"
of the agreement by the union would not eliminate the company's duty
to arbitrate the dispute.13  It is also consistent with the previous hold-
ing in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills'39 that a court order compelling
specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate does not contravene
section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia. Therefore, the Court agreed with the
petitioner's contention that the alleged no-strike violation was arbitrable.
The Court, however, refused to grant petitioner the injunctive relief
sought pending the arbitrator's determination.
The Court submitted that the parties' quid pro quo was not ham-
pered by allowing the sympathy strike to continue pending arbitration.
Since the fact pattern in Buffalo Forge materially deviated from that
in Boys Markets, the Court held that the rationale underlying Boys
Markets was not applicable to sympathy strikes. 4 Accommodation was
not mandated in Buffalo Forge, as it had been in Boys Markets, and
the Court refused to expand the scope of Boys Markets to include sym-
pathy strikes. The Court's primary concern was the continued vitality
of Norris-LaGuardia, which would be unduly undermined if the sym-
pathy strike was enjoined. 14 1
The Buffalo Forge Court, impliedly adopting the considerations of
Judge Hunter in his dissent in NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive
Chauffeurs, Local 926,142 stated that "[t]he strike had neither the pur-
pose nor the effect of denying or evading an obligation to arbitrate or of
depriving the employer of his bargain."' 43 Although the dispute was re-
garded as arbitrable, since it did not originate over a grievance, the
union was not required to observe its concomitant no-strike obligation.
Also, the Court noted that if the injunction were issued, Norris-La-
Guardia's vitality would be severely curtailed 144 by the future ability to
enjoin any strike concerning an alleged contractual violation regardless
of the express prohibitions of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The Court reasoned that section 301 of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act was intended to enforce collective bargaining agreements
including arbitration provisions, but that section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia
does not permit injunctions before it has been determined that a viola-
tion of the contract has, in fact, occurred."45
137 For a discussion of Drake, see notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
13 370 U.S. at 262-63. The Court in Drake denied that the union's faithful perfor-
mance of the no-strike obligation was a condition precedent to the company's duty to
arbitrate the alleged violation of a no-strike clause. Id. at 261.
139 See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
140 428 U.S. at 407.
141 Id. at 410-11.
14 502 F.2d 321, 326 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
143 428 U.S. at 408.
14 428 U.S. at 410-12. See also 468 F.2d 1372, 1373 (5th Cir. 1972).
145 428 U.S. at 410.
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The Court interpreted Boys Markets as requiring an underlying dis-
pute as well as an arbitrable dispute. Absent the underlying dispute, a
strike could only be enjoined after an arbitrator's determination that
the union activity violated the no-strike clause. Moreover, the Court
determined that when the agreement lacked an express no-strike clause,
an implied no-strike provision would be insufficient to allow the injunc-
tion to issue. To the extent that some courts had implied a no-strike
clause and enjoined the sympathy strike pending arbitration, the Court
noted that those courts were incorrect.
1 48
Furthermore, the Court discredited the pro-injunction school for its
inference that Boys Markets extended to any alleged breach of a labor
contract. The Court was primarily concerned with the potential for in-
creased district court activity at the preliminary injunction stage, sim-
ply because the dispute was found to be arbitrable. Not only would this
extend the scope of court involvement beyond that prescribed in the
Steelworkers Trilogy,147 but it would also directly contravene section 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Under the guise of maintaining the status
quo ante, upon a finding that the dispute was arbitrable, the courts
could "hold hearings, make findings of fact, interpret the applicable
provisions of the contract and issue injunctions.- 148 If the federal
courts had the power to determine factual and legal issues that ema-
nated from an arbitrable dispute at the preliminary injunction stage,
this activity would ultimately usurp the purpose of arbitration.149 Hence
a strike cannot be enjoined pending arbitration of its legality simply
because a dispute over the scope of the no-strike clause has arisen from
that strike. The Boys Markets accommodation was limited to its facts
and to the requirements by which it accommodated section 4 and sec-
tion 301.
Justice Stevens was joined in a vigorous dissent to Buffalo Forge
by Justice Brennan, author of the Boys Markets requirements. Re-
garding the quid pro quo as a single entity, the dissent contended that
the Court had severed that doctrine into two parts: one which was en-
joinable; the other which was not.15° Boys Markets narrow holding,
the dissent argued, was not further constrained by the "over a grievance"
requirement; but, extended to all suits "clearly within" the ambit of the
no-strike obligation.'51 Therefore, the dissent reasoned, the policy un-
derlying Boys Markets mandated a different conclusion.
The dissenting argument, which favored issuance of an injunction
pending arbitration, evolved from two main sources: the reasoning un-
derlying Boys Markets and the congressional policy favoring arbitration
which was promoted by Boys Markets. The dissent listed five consid-
'46 Id. at 408 n.10; see note 105 supra and accompanying text.
147 428 U.S. at 410-11. For a discussion of the Steelworkers Trilogy see notes 44-50
and accompanying text.
148 Id.
149 428 U.S. 412. See note 49 supra.
50 428 U.S. at 413 & n.2.
151 Id. at 424-26.
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erations underlying Boys Markets that necessitated a different result in
Buffalo Forge: the central policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not
retarded but enhanced by the enforcement of a labor contract the union
had freely entered;1 52 the quid pro quo doctrine was not limited to
strikes "over an arbitrable grievance" but extended to "clear" viola-
tions of the no-strike obligation;15 3 a literal reading of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act did not complement contemporary labor policy, and
section 4's injunction ban did not absolutely preclude federal enforce-
ment of a no-strike clause; 15 4 uniformity between state and federal for-
ums would be thwarted by barring federal use of the injunction remedy
in sympathy strikes; 155 and the quid pro quo doctrine and the federal
policy favoring binding arbitration must promote the employer's desire
for uninterrupted operation during the term of the contract. 156 Thus,
Boys Markets protected the integrity of the labor contract by compelling
the arbitration process and the quid pro quo of that process.
In protecting the contract, the courts were bound by the scope of that
document. 5 7  Therefore, the majority and the dissent agreed that an
implied no-strike clause could not be extended to include an obligation
to cross a picket line, regardless of the quid pro quo doctrine. Noting
that the court's function was merely to apply the contract into which
each party had freely entered, the quid pro quo would only be preserved
when a strike violative of an express no-strike commitment was enjoined
pending arbitration. 15 It would be pure speculation to conclude that
sympathy strikes would be included in an implied no-strike clause.
Presumably based on this reasoning, the dissent determined that some
courts had incorrectly decided that an obligation not to respect picket
lines could be implied from broad arbitration clauses. 159
The dissent essentially argued that the majority merely stated broad
considerations at the expense of the federal judiciary's ability to adjudi-
cate in a specific situation. The dissent reasoned that to issue an in-
junction after the arbitrator has determined that the activity is a viola-
tion prior to arbitration was an unreasonable interpretation of the court's
power. Justice Stevens noted:
The net effect of the arbitration process is to remove complete-
ly any ambiguity in the agreement as it applies to an unfore-
seen, or undescribed, set of facts. But if the specific situation
is foreseen and described in the contract itself with such preci-
sion that there is no need for interpretation by an arbitrator, it
would be reasonable to give the same legal effect to such an
agreement prior to the arbitrator's decision. . . . And if the
152 Id. at 417.
'sa Id. at 419.
'5 Id. at 422.
155 Id. at 423. See notes 64, 65 supra and accompanying text.
15 428 U.S. at 424.
"" See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
's 428 U.S. at 408 & n.10; id. at 4.5 & n.17.
I5 ld. at 425 & n.17. See notes 105-11, 146 supra and accompanying text.
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agreement were so plainly unambiguous that there could be no
bona fide issue to submit to the arbitrator, there must be the
same authority to enforce the parties' bargain pending the arbi-
trator's final decision.'16
Other factors shaped the dissent's argument that the inability to enjoin
this strike hampered effective arbitration. Since the injunction de-
pended upon the particular facts of each case, a rule that subordinated
consideration of the immediate situation, in order to perpetuate broad
policy concerns, constituted an application of form over substance.
Ultimately the congressional policy favoring arbitration would be
thwarted, since the courts would be propounding broad policy at the
expense of compelling immediate enforcement of the grievance settle-
ment procedures which the parties freely undertook. Such a condition
would not only hamper effectuating the quid pro quo, but also would
endorse judicial interpretation of the merits of the case, thereby elimi-
nating the need for arbitration. The dissent reasoned that precedent
dictated that a "substantial question of contractual interpretation" war-
ranted the use of the court's federal equity jurisdiction to compel arbi-
tration, 16 1 and, therefore, also militated in favor of enjoining a strike
clearly in violation of the quid pro quo, the no-strike clause.
Disputing the Court's reasoning that the injunction would constitute
a decision of contractual disputes at the preliminary injunction stage,162
the dissent argued that the preservation of the status quo ante pending
arbitration on the merits, by definition, would not supplant the arbi-
trator's decision.iei Moreover, even though the dissent conceded that
an injunction improperly issued might terminate a legal strike, it urged
that this fact merely compelled the need for expedited arbitration rather
than an irrevocable denial of federal court jurisdiction. Furthermore,
the dissent contended that denial of the injunction could produce ef-
fects equally as devastating to the employer, when the strike violated
the contract, as the issuance of the injunction against the union when
the strike was legal. Because the strike neither furthered any economic
interest of the sympathy strikers nor attempted to resolve any dispute
between the employer and the employees, the injunction would not
frustrate any underlying policy of Norris-LaGuardia.
One of the grounds for denying the injunction in the Second Circuit
was that the enjoining of a strike which did not seek to redress any
grievance would virtually obliterate the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia
160 428 U.S. at 426 (footnotes omitted).
161 Id. at 414 (quoting Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 382-
84 (1974)).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 428. By definition, the temporary restraining order and the preliminary
injunction are issued to preserve the status quo ante the alleged violation and to prevent
the petitioner from sustaining irreparable injury pending decision on the merits. Such
equitable remedies, therefore, preserve the setting for effective arbitration and restrain
conditions from degenerating to a degree where an arbitrator's decision that the contract
had been violated would be insufficient to remedy the harm done.
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Act.1' 4 Utilizing this frustration of policy approach, the dissent classi-
fied a strike which clearly violated the contract but which did not seek
to redress grievances, as hindering the congressional policy supporting
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
To promote the contemporary utility of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
to effectuate the congressional concern for the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements, Justice Stevens suggested four conditions prece-
dent, the fulfillment of which would enable the sympathy strike to be
enjoined: the union, prior to injunction, should be permitted to present
its argument for contractual justification for honoring picket lines; the
strike must be "clearly within the no-strike clause;" the injunction must
be conditioned upon immediate submission to the grievance-arbitration
procedures or upon submission to arbitration upon an expedited schedule;
and the traditional equitable requirements must be met. 65
Rather than relying on the rule of Boys Markets, which would ir-
revocably deny enjoining sympathy strikes, Justice Stevens interpreted
the spirit of that case as allowing injunctive relief when the sympathy
strike constituted a clear violation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
IV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCrIVE RELIEF IN
Buffalo Forge
Three major policy concerns were reflected in the Buffalo Forge de-
cision: proper enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement;
preservation of the arbitrator's function to render a determination on
the merits of the labor dispute; and preservation of a union member's
statutory right to honor a picket line. The majority opinion held that in
order to preserve the right to honor a picket line, such union activity
may not be enjoined unless that right has been expressly waived, and
waiver cannot be inferred from a broad no-strike clause. The arbitrator
must be the first to decide that the strike is a contract violation to assure
the district court that an injunction would not threaten protected union
activity. Thus, the majority reasoned, the arbitrator's function will be
preserved without influence from the district court, and the collective
bargaining agreement will be protected by compelling the parties to re-
sort to the grievance settlement procedures for which they bargained. 66
164 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1975).
165 428 U.S. at 431-32. These conditions precedent are essentially those propounded
in the Boys Markets case.
166 Justice White noted:
As is typical, the agreement in this case outlines the pre-arbitration settlement
procedures and provides that if the grievance "has not been ... satisfactorily
adjusted," arbitration may be had. Nowhere does it provide for coercive action
of any kind, let alone judicial injunctions, short of the terminal decision of the
arbitrator. The parties have agreed to grieve and arbitrate, not to litigate.
They have not contracted for a judicial preview of the facts and the law. Had they
anticipated additional regulation of their relationships pending arbitration, it
seems very doubtful that they would have resorted to litigation rather than to
private arrangements.
428 U.S. at 411 (citation omitted).
Thus, the majority adopted a policy of strict construction regarding the interpretation
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The majority holding, however, raises serious doubts about the future
enforceability of the quid pro quo doctrine and the prospective use of
arbitration as a forum for settling grievances. An employer will cer-
tainly hesitate to be bound by a broad mandatory arbitration procedure if
the union's concomitant no-strike obligation is only partially enforce-
able. Accordingly, if the employer is aware that sympathy strikes shall
not be within the ambit of a clause prohibiting "strikes, work stoppages
or impeding of work,"'67 he will surely bargain for a limited arbitration
clause. The effectiveness of arbitration as a peaceful means of settling
labor-management disputes could be eliminated, with economic war-
fare emerging as a more compelling alternative. 168  Thus, the majority
opinion hinders, rather than promotes, the congressional policy favoring
arbitration; in effect, it sanctions a quid pro quo that is only partially
enforceable. 16 9
of the collective bargaining agreement. See Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d
284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975), in which a National Labor Relations
Board decision that an explicit waiver was required to suspend an employee's section 7
rights to honor a picket line, was enforced by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
NLRB held that the broad no-strike pledge only applied to matters that the employer
agreed to arbitrate, and that a fellow union's complaint was not arbitrable under the
first union's contract. Therefore, the no-strike provision did not cover the sympathy
strike activity, and the employer violated section 7 rights by discharging employees who
observed the line. See also Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 850 (1972), in which the circuit court upheld the Board's decision that discharge
of sympathy striking employees, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, was an
unfair labor practice. The court distinguished between the language of a no-strike provi-
sion and a no sympathy strike provision and concluded that individual employees were not
denied the privilege of honoring a picket line.
The reasoning behind the Kellogg decision, however, is questionable since it related
union culpability to agency considerations. See Edwards & Gergmann, The Legal and
Practical Remedies Available to Employers to Enforce a Contractual "No-Strike" Commit-
ment, 21 LAB. L. J. 3, 5 & n.9 (1970); see also United Steelworkers v. CCI Corp., 395 F.2d
529, 532-33 (10th Cir. 1968) (union held liable, after the court pierced the subterfuge of
"individual" activity).
117 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 386 F. Supp. 405, 407 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
118 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. at 421 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453-55). A possible solution to
the Buffalo Forge problem is the incorporation of an expedited arbitration provision in the
collective bargaining agreement whereby an arbitrator's cease and desist order against an
illegal strike could be rendered in a predetermined number of hours. See Buffalo Forge
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. at 428-29.
In the interim between the Sinclair decision, see notes 51-59 supra and accompanying
text, and the Boys Markets decision, see notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text, the
only way to secure injunctive relief, notwithstanding Norris-LaGuardia's interdictions, was
through the enforcement of an arbitral award. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. ILA,
Local 1291, 368 F.2d 932, 934 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 64 (1967);
New Orleans I.I. Ass'n v. ILA, Local 1418, 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
828 (1968). This approach warrants that the parties honor their contractual obligations,
allows injunctive relief only after an arbitrator's award, and minimizes an employer's
damages as a result of an interruption in work production.
Under an expedited arbitration provision, the sole question which should be presented
to the arbitrator is whether the employees are engaging in an illegal work stoppage.
The presentation before the arbitrator should also be in lieu of any other "in-house" ar-
bitration procedures in the interest of time and minimization of injury. Under tradi-
tional methods of arbitration, when an arbitrator's decision would be the last step in the
arbitration procedure, enforcement of the arbitrator's award could be delayed for an
indeterminate amount of time if recalcitrant parties decided to engage in dilatory tactics.
See Bakaly & Pepe, And After Avco, 20 LAB. L.J. 67, 73-78 (1969).
109 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. at 413 & n.2. The same
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Justice White's majority opinion centered around restraining undue
judicial interference with the merits of the grievance during the court's
hearing on whether the preliminary injunction should issue.170 Even if
the equities weigh in favor of an injunction, however, the Buffalo Forge
decision restrains courts from enjoining the strike pending arbitration.
In effect, this result employs the Norris-LaGuardia Act to shield striking
unions from liability, regardless of the legal status of the strike.171
The Court has justified this result on two grounds: first, that this
strike is not "over a grievance" that is contractually arbitrable; and,
that an injunction pending arbitration, in such cases would be a decision
on the merits since issuance of the preliminary injunction pending arbitra-
tion of the dispute would terminate the strike and effectively create a
permanent injunction.
The Court has disregarded the fact that an injunction is an equitable
remedy used to preserve the status quo ante 72 and to prohibit acts
which would give the injured party a cause of action for which the law
affords no adequate or complete relief. The majority decision thwarts
this purpose based on the supposition that the district court's inquiry,
upon a finding that the dispute is arbitrable, even though the dispute
is not an underlying cause of the strike, will eventually extend to the
merits of the dispute and will "cut deeply into the policy of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.' 73
To pursue effective arbitration, and promote the quid pro quo be-
tween the parties, the situation compels a restoration as nearly as pos-
conclusion was reached by commentators even before the Boys Markets decision. See
Bakaly & Pepe, And After Avco, 20 LAB. L.J. 67, 69, 73 (1969).
170 Permanent injunctions are issued as complete injunctive relief after a full hearing
on the merits of the dispute. Preliminary injunctions are issued for short-term purposes,
generally to prevent irreparable injury to the petitioner pending a disposition on the
merits.
The preliminary injunction is one of two categories of interlocutory injunctions. It
may issue only after the respondent has been given notice and an opportunity to be heard
on the applicability of the injunction. The other is a temporary restraining order, which
may be issued ex parte, without notice or an opportunity to be heard. See section 7 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
The fact that a temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte, on affidavits
alleging that unavoidable injury will otherwise occur, substantially increases the chances
for abuse. The unbridled issuance of ex parte restraining orders was one of the abuses
that prompted the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See F. FRANKFURTER & N.
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCrION 60 (1930). At least two commentators have, therefore,
recommended that the ex parte restraining order be abolished. Id. at 200-02, 224.
For a discussion of the practical considerations underlying all injunctive relief, see
Axelrod, The Application of the Boys Markets Decision In the Federal Courts, 16 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 893, 950-57 (1975).
171 428 U.S. at 430.
172 The court invoking its equity powers may be given jurisdiction to decide its own
jurisdiction. It may also have the additional power to preserve the status quo by injunction,
so that its jurisdiction to decide its own jurisdiction is preserved. United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 290, 292-93 & n.57 (1947) (nation-wide coal strike pre-
vented by injunction).
The court would not usurp its jurisdiction in determining the adequacy of proof of
irreparable injury, for this allegation is the keystone upon which the forum of a court of
equity rests. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Detroit Typographical Union 18, 471
F.2d 872, 875 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1975).
173 428 U.S. at 410. It has been noted that reliance upon the status quo approach is an
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sible to the status quo ante the alleged violation.1 74  This does no harm
to the policies underlying Norris-LaGuardia. Section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was not intended to apply to injunctions for maintaining
the status quo while the parties to a labor dispute pursued negotiation,
mediation, or arbitration. 175  In the long run, the status quo ante ap-
proach prevents the situation from degenerating beyond repair and per-
mits a party who has alleged a contract violation and has met his burden
of proving irreparable injury the opportunity to pursue arbitration in a
less complicated and pressured setting. 176
The applicability of the injunction pending arbitration was illustrated
by the recent work stoppages in the West Virginia coal mines. Local
1759 of the United Mine Workers struck a West Virginia coal mine and
other locals soon began striking in sympathy. The strike stretched to
seven states, included 90,000 coal miners, and threatened to disrupt all
industries that rely on coal. 177  Thus, a strike at one plant of a major
industry can mushroom into an industry-wide strike, and have a serious
effect on the economy. 178 While the sympathy strikers may not be seek-
ing redress of any grievance with the employer, the propensities for
causing injury, and bringing pressure on the employer to resolve ar-
bitrable disputes prior to arbitration, 79 require a more flexible alternative
than an absolute injunction ban pending arbitration. 80
The majority's viewpoint that the dispute will ultimately be resolved
illusion, for the "situation does got remain in equilibrium awaiting judgment upon full
knowledge." F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 201 (1930).
"I See Trinity Valley Iron & Steel Co. v. NLRB, 410 F.2d 1161, 1167-68 (5th Cir.
1969); Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the Judges: The Boys Markets Case,
1970 Sup. CT. REv. 215, 242.
'75 See Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 817 (1964). The court held that section 4's prohibition does not apply to the
Railway Labor Act's status quo provisions pending arbitration, negotiation, or mediation.
Cf. Association of Gen. Contractors v. Illinois Conference of Teamsters, 454 F.2d 1324
(7th Cir. 1972) (Norris-LaGuardia Act does not permit a preliminary injunction against a
union to preserve the status quo pending arbitration on the merits).
7I' See Pittsburgh Newspaper Printing, No. 9 v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 479 F.2d 607,
609-10 (3d Cir. 1973) (action by unions to enjoin employer from reducing number of work
shifts pending arbitration of the dispute. Showing of irreparable injury is a condition
precedent to issuance of injunction); but see Southern Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Fireman, 337 F.2d 127, 133-34 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (injunction compelling railroad to
employ firemen in all locomotives until decision was rendered by National Railway
Adjustment Board. When public, not just private interests are involved, proof of ir-
reparable injury is not requisite to injunctive relief).
I" Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1976, at 1, col. 4; Wall St. J., July 23, 1976, at 2, col. 3.
178 See Wall St. J., July 30, 1976, at 6, col. 4. It was reported that during April
through June 1976, 1.4 million workers were involved in work stoppages, resulting in 13.3
million lost work days. This resulted in one of the highest amount of days lost in two
years; surpdssed only by the third quarter of 1974, when 17.9 million work days were lost.
Approximately 5.5 million working days were lost in June alone, averaging out to 3.1
working days per thousand workers, up from 2.9 in May and 1.8 in April. The June level
was the highest for any month since August 1974.
17' Even when the unions have reserved the right to respect lawful primary picket lines
it may be found that their refusal to cross the lines was an attempt to bring pressure on the
employer to resolve arbitrable disputes prior to arbitration. See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.
Food Drivers, Local 500, 363 F. Supp. 1255, 1256-58 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
1s0 Expedited arbitration might be an alternative to this situation. See note 168 supra.
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by the arbitrator simply avoids consideration of the immediacy that a
particular situation may warrant. Even a court order compelling arbitra-
tion, with the availability of a contempt order to back it up, does not
provide the most adequate remedy for a strike that is clearly within the
scope of a no-strike clause. There are no guarantees that the union
will abide by the court's order, or ultimately, the arbitrator's ruling.
Additionally, valuable time and needless expense are required to effect
that which the parties' quid pro quo was intended to control.'" There-
fore, the courts, after a hearing and a finding that the issue of the scope
of the no-strike clause is clearly an arbitrable dispute, will most success-
fully avoid the merits of the dispute by immediately compelling arbitra-
tion, 8 2 and by preserving the status quo ante pending the arbitrator's
decision. This approach respects both the broadness and ambiguity of
the labor contract's terms.
Notwithstanding the traditional requirements for an injunction, Boys
Markets and the labor policy enunciated in the Steelworkers Trilogy did
somewhat modify the criteria whereby an injunction may be issued.
Traditionally, a motion for a preliminary injunction required the court
to find that the petitioner had shown probable success on the merits' 83
Literally, Boys Markets does not require a finding as to the probable
success on the merits, and judicial deference to arbitration suggests
that federal courts should avoid any such requirement. It would re-
quire additional testimony as to the contracting intent of the parties,
it would be speculative, and the decision would threaten to ultimately
"I' See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947) (district court
not deprived of jurisdiction to issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary in-
junction to prevent a nation-wide coal strike, pending judicial interpretation of a labor
contract between the Government and the union). The union refused to heed a back to
work order and was found guilty of criminal and civil contempt. Nonetheless the union
still did not heed the court's order. The strike had the potential of affecting many other
industries, and creating a nation-wide coal strike.
12 The issuance of the injunction because of the immediacy of the situation has
caused dispute among commentators. One argued that such an approach would do in-
directly what Sinclair prohibited directly. Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the
Judges: The Boys Markets Case, 1970 Sup. CT. REV. 215, 244; another noted that the
employer highly values the injunction since it is fast and decisive. These are the same
reasons why the union deplores it; the union is necessarily interested in maintaining the
procedural safeguards, particularly notice and hearing, to ensure that a legitimate union
activity will not be enjoined. Note, The New Federal Law of Labor Injunctions, 79 YALE
L. REV. 1593, 1601 (1970). The author recommended that the court resolve procedural
questions in the union's favor to ensure that injunctions or temporary restraining orders
will be issued only in instances when union activities are clearly in violation of the no-
strike clause.
113 A decision on the merits will not be made when a preliminary injunction has been
prayed for, however, in exercising its discretion on the suitability of a preliminary injunc-
tion, a court would normally take ultimate success or failure on the merits into considera-
tion. A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1111, 1115-16 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Societe
Comptoir de l'Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Bouseac v. Alexander's Dep't Stores,
Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1962); Perry v. Perry, 190 F.2d 601, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2) provides also that before or after the commencement of the
hearing on a preliminary injunction, the court may accelerate the trial on the merits and
consolidate it with the hearing on the injunction. Even if the consolidation is not ordered,
any evidence received on the hearing for the injunction would be admissable at the trial
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replace the arbitrator's function.18 4 The modification requires only that
the federal courts base their inquiry on the parties' collective bargaining
agreement and that the courts utilize their equity jurisdiction to prevent
a contract violation from creating irreparable injury. Boys Markets
never suggested that equitable considerations were *to be waived. 85
The injunction pending arbitration of the labor dispute is further
justified by the fact that damages or discharge of employees after arbi-
tration are not as effective as an immediate halt to the alleged contract
violation. A damage or discharge action prosecuted after the termina-
tion of the strike may exacerbate rather than remedy the situation.'
If the employer requests arbitration but the union refuses, and a court
compels arbitration, the order may be totally ineffective without the
injunction. 187
Congress authorized a broad grant of federal jurisdiction for viola-
tions of labor contracts in section 301(a), eliminating the dollar amount
and diversity requirements.8 8 The mere fact that Congress did not
qualify section 4's broad restriction on federal equity jurisdiction is not
to say that Congress specifically rejected such a qualification. 18 9
The Supreme Court recognized the need to accommodate section 4
and section 301(a) in Boys Markets. The Court thus developed a "test"
through which district courts could determine whether they had juris-
diction to enjoin a strike over an arbitrable grievance, thereby further-
ing the arbitration process. The need to accommodate section 4 and
section 301(a) did not culminate with the facts of Boys Markets. The
Boys Markets test cannot be strictly and literally applied since that case
represented a need to accommodate the competing considerations of two
legislative enactments to the particular facts of one case. Previous
Supreme Court decisions also manifested the need for case-by-case
accommodation. 190
114 Cf. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union 53, 520 F.2d
1220, 1223-27 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1976) (the Court applied the
"success on the merits" test to the Boys Markets criteria and held the sympathy strike
could not be enjoined pending arbitration). The petitioner need not, however, prove his
case on the merits to obtain an interlocutory injunction. B.W. Photo Util. v. Republic
Molding Corp., 280 F.2d 806, 807 (9th Cir. 1960).
s The Court based its decision on the fact that the underlying dispute was not an
arbitrable grievance, it never reached a decision on equitable considerations.
1'6 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970);
ABA Section of Labor Relations Law - 1963 Proceedings, Special Atkinson-Sinclair Com-
mittee (Report of Neutral Members) 241, 242 (1964).
117 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 216-17 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
"I8 The text of section 301(a) is set out in full at note 3 supra.
189 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 216-17 & n.2 (1962) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
10 See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text. The Court held in Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R. that section 4 could be qualified to the extent
of compelling enforcement with section 3, First, of the Railway Labor Act. That section
authorized either party to submit a minor dispute to the National Railroad Adjustment
Board, whose decision would be final and binding upon both parties. The fact that sec-
tion 2, Sixth, of the Railway Labor Act defines a minor dispute as a "controversy over the
meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement" suggests that the Court, follow-
ing a pattern of consistency and predictability, should have regarded the more specific
35Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The parties in Buffalo Forge had provided for the arbitration of any
dispute as to the "meaning and application of the ... agreement."' 9'
The Court noted that the breadth of this clause and the other grievance
procedure clauses did not include injunctive relief as a means for re-
solving grievances. The fact is that the preliminary injunction in this
case would not have effected a settlement, but would only have been
the means to the most expeditious and equitable settlement.
The Buffalo Forge Court noted that the timing of the strike was es-
sential to the overall effect of that activity, and that a strike impor-
tuneously enjoined would be effectively terminated. 9 2 The timing of
the strike is, however, not as important to the sympathy strikers, who
are not striking because of any underlying grievance, as the immediacy
of the injunction is to the employer who has shown a contract violation
and has proven irreparable injury due to a work stoppage. Damages
may be impossible to calculate, 19 3 customers may be lost, and the em-
ployer will not be receiving redress for the alleged breach of the quid
pro quo. 94 Hence, application of an inapposite "judicially invented"
test relegates the parties to a strike situation that was arguably elimi-
nated by virtue of their contract. In the situation in which the strike
clearly comes within the ambit of the no-strike restriction, and is con-
tractually arbitrable, it is the proper functioning of the quid pro quo to
submit the dispute to arbitration as expeditiously as possible. 9 5
When the parties are bound by the broad and all-encompassing pro-
visions of no-strike and arbitration provisions, the real issue centers
around whether the union has waived its members' statutory right to
strike, including their right to respect a picket line. Such an issue has
no relevance to the core purpose of Norris-LaGuardia, which was in-
tended to promote the growth of labor organizations.19  Notwithstand-
ing the accommodation between section 4 and section 301(a), the quid
pro quo requires an immediate interpretation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement by an arbitrator, for whose interpretation the parties had
bargained. Whether section 4 will be violated is inapposite to this con-
sideration. Therefore, we should not construct a "fictitious issue [at
the expense of] the real conduct whose justifiability is in question." 197
This is not to suggest that every alleged no-strike breach will compel
language of section 301(a) as tempering the ubiquitous and all-inclusive language of
section 4, to the extent that a clear violation of the contract could be enjoined.
"I1 See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
192 428 U.S. at 412 (1976).
193 See notes 93, 186 supra and accompanying text. See also Fairweather, Employer
Actions and Options in Response to Strikes in Breach of Contract, 18 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF.
LAB. 129, 149-58 (1966).
114 See Bakaly & Pepe, And After Avco, 20 LAB. L.J. 67 (1969).
195 Cf. United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d 1236, 1245,
1248-49 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976) (the "'state of the law"
prohibited the injunction even though the union was in contempt of one injunction, and
had been in contempt of others, and when the court found that the employer would be
helpless without the issuance of a prospective injunction).
1'6 Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
197 F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 35 (1930).
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the functioning of the quid pro quo. But, when the broad scope of
the no-strike clause leaves no other conclusion than that the statutory
right to respect picket lines has been bargained away, the district court's
proper function is to respect the scope of the clause and enjoin the
strike pending an arbitrator's decision.'98
The complexity of labor disputes, the complications in the law sur-
rounding such disputes, the animosities and mutual distrust between la-
bor and management, and the goal of promoting peaceful and unim-
peded production, require a flexible approach to each particular
situation. One test cannot be devised that will meet every injunction
situation. The preservation of the quid pro quo is dependant upon
judicial freedom to deal with the particular facts of each case. The
majority decision, however, has relegated federal equity jurisdiction in
sympathy strike situations to the arbitrator's decision.
The same reasons that led the Boys Markets Court to reject a me-
chanical application of the doctrine of stare decisis' 99 were equally
applicable in Buffalo Forge. The divergent fact pattern required a new
understanding of the interplay between section 4 and section 301 rather
than a blanket denial of the need to accommodate these sections. Hence,
the Court has, seven years after overruling Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson, 2°0 again reverted to a literal interpretation of section 4.
The Court in Buffalo Forge, as in Sinclair, relied upon the historical
significance of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, rather than its contemporary
utility.
The Buffalo Forge decision has also hampered uniformity between
state and federal jurisdictions to issue equitable remedies. Since
Norris-LaGuardia applies only to federal courts, a state court remains
free to enjoin a sympathy strike. The injunction, however, will be dis-
solved if the case is removed to federal court.20 1
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion reflects the flexibility with which
labor law cases must be judged. Without this approach, the collective
bargaining agreement would be an ephemeral document to which the
parties would only pay lip service. The dissent suggested that the Boys
Markets doctrine promoting accommodation should be applied to meet
the expectations of the parties in a particular situation. The fact that
Justice Brennan, author of the Boys Markets requirements, joined in the
Buffalo Forge dissent, is some indication that Boys Markets was not
intended to be limited to its facts but, to the contrary, advocated a
much broader policy of accommodation.2 0 2  Furthermore, the under-
lying Boys Markets rationale of effectuating the parties' quid pro quo
' Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 432 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); contra, Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, Local 1537, 545 F.2d 1336,
1341 (3d Cir. 1976).
"' Boys Markets v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970).
200 For a discussion of the Sinclair decision and its effects, see notes 51-59 supra and
accompanying text.
201 See notes 64, 65 supra and accompanying text.
202 As a historical note, Justice White dissented in Boys Markets based upon "the
reasons stated in the majority opinion in Sinclair." 398 U.S. at 261.
19761
37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
and furthering the arbitration process, permits an injunction to issue when
the parties are bound by a mandatory arbitration procedure and the
sympathy strike is clearly in violation of the no-strike clause.21 3
The conditions precedent for the issuance of an injunction, which
Justice Stevens suggested, are not novel criteria to be considered, but
are a restatement of the underlying rationale of Boys Markets. The
"test" in Boys Markets is relevant only to the fact after which it was
patterned. The majority correctly determined that the test had no rele-
vance to Buffalo Forge, however, the majority misconceived the test as
representing Boys Markets substantive import. The test merely repre-
sented how one factual pattern would fit within the accommodation.
It was not intended to irrevocably preclude an injunction when all con-
ditions, but for the "over a grievance" requirement, were met. There-
fore, although the test in Boys Markets will always be distinguishable
from a Buffalo Forge situation, the reasoning underlying the rule com-
pels a holding that when a strike is clearly in violation of a no-strike
clause, a district court should have the power to issue a preliminary
injunction pending an arbitrator's decision on the merits. Conditioning
the strike on an immediate submission to arbitration will protect the
parties quid pro quo by setting the arbitration process in motion, and
will only briefly postpone the right to honor a picket line. This is what
was bargained for by the parties.
V. CONCLUSION
The Buffalo Forge decision heralded a new era for a literal reading
of section 4. Although the majority holding is not as sweeping as the
decision in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, in that at some point in
time an injunction may be issued, still, the opinion resurrects the strict
adherence to section 4 that Boys Markets had tempered. Over-
dependence on the broad language of section 4 is misplaced when it is
recognized that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not meant to immunize
the union from all injunctions. The fact that section 7 of that Act allows
a temporary restraining order to be issued ex parte reflects congres-
sional authorization of the federal judiciary to have more than an in-
cidental role in the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
It manifests congressional acknowledgement that the federal judiciary is
an able interpreter of the immediacy needed to remedy a particular situa-
tion. It contravenes the majority's determination that an injunction
may issue only after an arbitrator has decided it may.
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion allows a more flexible approach in
studying the legality of the right to honor a picket line. His opinion
more closely follows the reasoning behind Boys Markets, for the focal
point in that case was not that the strike was "over a grievance;" but
that the strike "clearly" violated the no-strike agreement. 0 4 The prop-
er enforcement of the quid pro quo and the congressional policy favor-
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ing arbitration are dependent upon recognition of this fact. Thus,
upon a finding of a clear violation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, an injunction should issue conditioned upon an immediate sub-
mission of the issue to arbitration.
The core purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to promote the
growth of labor organizations and their ability to bargain collec-
tively.20 5 In preserving the literal language of section 4, the Court in
Buffalo Forge has diminished the salutary effects of that bargain.
MICHAEL E. KUSHNER
205 See section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
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